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Nuclear Theft: Real and Imagined Dangers, examines the
possibility of theft of fissionable material from the U.S.
nuclear power industry by non-governmental individuals or
groups. The study investigates the availability of fis-
sionable material, vulnerable portions of the nuclear fuel
cycles, weapon construction, and the regulations regarding
the protection of fissionable material. The study uses a
morphological approach to evaluate the capability of poten-
tial thieves by group size and classification. Possible
motivations for committing nuclear theft are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Norfolk, Va. - Yesterday it was discovered by Virginia
law enforcement officials that 25 kilograms of plutonium
nitrate in solution were stolen in a murder-hijacking near
the Atlantic coast resort town of Virginia Beach. The plu-
tonium, on its way from a reprocessing plant in South Carolina
to an undisclosed storage facility in New York State, was
hijacked despite federal safeguards to protect against such
an event. The hijacking was the first of its kind in that
no theft of nuclear "bomb" material has ever been reported.
As a result of the theft, a 10-state "dragnet" has been
instituted, the FBI revealed. Although the FBI will coor-
dinate the search, a command post has been set up here by
members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the
Energy Resources Development Administration (ERDA) . To
assist the law enforcement agencies in their search, the
NRC and ERDA personnel have provided some aircraft and equip-
ment useful in localizing the plutonium; however, experts say
the equipment must be very close to the radioactive material
before a detection can be made.
The first report that the hijacking had taken place came
from state troopers patrolling an isolated stretch of Highway
17. Motorists stopped to assist a reprocessing plant guard
who had been shot several times. The guard, left for dead
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by his assailants in a nearby ditch, was able to explain that
he had been shot by men wearing plant security uniforms like
his own. A second guard was found dead a few minutes later.
Both men were taken to Virginia Beach Hospital.
The surviving guard, identified as Mr. Henry Hanson of
Boone Mountain, South Carolina, was listed in serious con-
dition after sustaining gun-shot wounds to the chest and
abdomen. The second guard, also the escort companion of
Mr. Hanson, was pronounced dead on arrival; his name is being
withheld pending notification of next of kin. Although wounded,
Mr. Hanson was able to give the FBI an extensive account of
circumstances surrounding the hijacking. The FBI said that
the Aj ax tractor- trailer which had been contracted to carry
the plutonium was proceeding north along a deserted stretch
of Highway 17. The truck was being escorted by the two guards
in a reprocessing plant security vehicle. For no apparent
reason the semi pulled off the highway into a protected area
and summoned the assistance of Mr. Hanson by radio. Upon
opening the cab of the tractor, Mr. Hanson was gunned down
by the driver. When asked about his recollection of the
alternate truck driver during the shooting, Mr. Hanson
reported that he though the other driver was unconscious on
the truck floor.
The circumstances surrounding the shooting of the guard
driving the escort vehicle are uncertain at this time, al-
though police believe that the truck driver had assistance
from another vehicle. This would account for the fact that
11

both the tractor-trailer and the escort vehicle were stolen
from the scene and are still missing.
The plutonium, enough to make several nuclear weapons or
cause thousands of cancers if properly dispersed, was not in
a form directly useable in a bomb, ERDA officials claimed.
However, many knowledgeable scientists around the country
say that relatively simple conversion techniques can change
the plutonium nitrate into a form required for use in nuclear
weapons. ERDA officials would not comment on why anyone would
want the plutonium except to say that every possible avenue
is being explored. The net value of the plutonium is said
to be on the order of $10,000 per kilogram, considerable more
than, gold or silver."
The past few years have been marked by an increase in
media, special interest groups and now public concern over
the tremendous, world-wide proliferation of nuclear material
as a result of the growth of the nuclear power industry.
Closely associated with this concern is a fear that the
proliferation of nuclear material will lead to the theft
of material which could be fashioned into an "atomic bomb"
or some other insidious weapon. In addition to the pro-
liferation problem, these fears have been fueled by the
unprecedented growth in terrorist activities, the inability
of our institutions to check escalating crime rates and,
perhaps, a deep-seated fear of nuclear power itself. There
is a growing minority of nuclear power critics and advocates
who feel that unless procedures used to safeguard nuclear
12

material are improved substantially,, nuclear theft will
become a reality. The fictitious newspaper article pre-
sented above was meant to be representative of the type of
future dilemma. foreseen.
This thesis is the culmination of a study which has
examined a problematic question: is the theft of fissionable
material from the U.S. nuclear power industry a credible
possibility? Several constraints have been applied to limit
the scope of the study as a practical matter. For the pur-
poses of this discussion, nuclear theft is defined as the
covert, clandestine or overt theft of nuclear material which
could feasibly be used to produce a fission explosion. Spe-
cifically, this study will concern itself with the theft of
U.S. nuclear material by non-governmental individuals or
groups and divorces itself from the problem of diversion
by foreign governments. Furthermore, this study will concern
itself primarily with nuclear material in the hands of private
industry, i.e., those materials subject to the regulations of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
.
There are several reasons for the emphasis on the indus-
trial aspects and applications of fissionable material.
Presently in the United States, there are three prime users
of weapons-grade nuclear material. The newly-formed Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and its three
The scenario presented in the article was meant to find
some middle ground between overzealous newspaper scenarios
showing 20 blood-thirsty terrorists brandishing automatic
weapons and some industry spokesmen who would have one believe
there is no threat.
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major laboratory complexes (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and the Scandia Laboratories)
perform the majority of weapons research and development
associated with the U.S. nuclear weapons program. Addition-
ally, ERDA conducts related programs which include power
reactor design, experimentation, and safety analysis, peaceful
and industrial nuclear explosive applications, controlled
thermo-nuclear power research, and laser fusion projects as
well as others.
The second major user of weapons-grade material in the
United States is the military. The military programs include
weapons development, nuclear propulsion, and other systems
associated with space programs. The military and ERDA enjoy
a symbiotic relationship in that nuclear weapons, propulsion
units, etc., are designed for military specifications and
custodied to the military by ERDA. The military does not
have self -administered research and development programs.
The other major producer/user of weapons-grade nuclear
material in the United States is the nuclear power industry.
As intimated earlier, the expansion of nuclear power is
rapidly producing more and more fissionable material. The
following quote is representative of that growth and the
commensurate concern:
"Plutonium cannot be used as fuel without first
undergoing processing in special plants; moreover, the
spent fuel by-products, called fission products, many
of which remain highly radioactive for thousands and
even hundreds of thousands of years, must be periodi-
cally removed from the reactor and shipped to storage
and burial sites across the country... What this means
14

is that, in the plutonium economy envisioned by the AEC,
enough plutonium to make thousands o£ bombs or lethal
dispersal devices, and enough curies of radioactive waste
to kill countless trillions of humans,, will move along
America's highways and railroads in thousands of shipments
every year, to and from reactors, reprocessing plants,
?fuel fabrication plants, and burial and storage sites.
Although the nuclear material referred to above is owned and
produced by the private sector, it is controlled and regulated
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Among other things, the
NRC is specifically charged with the responsibility of regu-
lating all licensed activities associated with the processing,
transport, and handling of nuclear materials. Additionally,
the Commission is responsible for providing and maintaining
safeguards against threats, thefts, and sabotage of nuclear
facilities and materials.
Of the three major users of nuclear material, ERDA and
the military have a distinct advantage in solving the problem
of providing safeguards and properly protecting nuclear
material, both organizations are able to use federal security
personnel and equipment to insure adequate protection. On
the other hand, the NRC must rely on private industry to
provide its own protection, hopefully corresponding to the
requirements set down by regulation. In order to achieve
some perspective on the problems inherent in protecting
fissionable material from theft, it will be useful to briefly
examine the history of safeguards in the United States.
"Can We Afford a Plutonium Economy," Natural Resources




For the first ten years following the development of
atomic weapons, the United States went to great pains to
assure the secrecy of budding nuclear technology. From the
early 40' s under the auspices of the "Manhattan Project,"
the production and processing of nuclear material was under
the direct and strict scrutiny of the military. Prior to the
end of WW II, the nuclear material that had been developed
was the world's supply and the only material suitable for use
in a nuclear weapon. During this period and for a decade
thereafter, the primary concern of the U.S. program for
protecting nuclear material was first, that it might be
diverted by foreign governments and, second, that it should
be accounted for because nuclear material was expensive. In
December of 1953, President Eisenhower made his famous "Atoms
for Peace" proposal before the United Nations. As a result,
the industrial use of fissionable material would demand that
"nuclear secrets" formerly held under tight military control
be declassified for consumption by private industry, although
the nuclear material was still owned and regulated by the
Federal Government. The legislation permitting this change
came about with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Under this
legislation the United States Government committed itself to
a program of private nuclear power development and established
an Atomic Energy Commission. The Commission was, among other
things, charged with the encouragement and regulation of the
nuclear power industry. The task of encouragement and
16

regulation resulted in a sort of legislated "conflict of
interest" which was to contribute significantly to the demise
of the AEC.
On 10 March 1967, the "Report to the Atomic Energy Com-
mission by the Ad Hoc Advisory Panel on Safeguarding Special
Nuclear Material," was submitted. This document, called the
Lumb Report, was to make the AEC aware that the possibility
of nuclear theft was real and that additional protection for
nuclear material was required. Although a program of safe-
guards was submitted by the Ad Hoc panel, only a few of the
safeguards were ever implemented. But r it was this document
which more than anything else began the safeguard debate.
Until about 1973, the term "safeguards" referred to
"measures to assure quick and reliable warning of any dis-
crepancy in quantities of nuclear materials that could signal
3
the theft and trigger recovery efforts." Recently, the
definition of "safeguards" has been expanded considerably to
include physical protection of material to prevent or deter
a theft and plans to stop robberies and recover stolen
property.
The perception of a "new threat" to nuclear material on
the part of various special interest groups and government
officials instigated a series of reports and a great deal
Donnelly, W. H. , "Special Nuclear Materials: Safeguards
Issue Brief Number IB74077," p. 2, The Library of Congress
Congressional Research Service , 31 January 1975.
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of publicity which highlighted the nuclear safeguards issue
and brought it to the attention of Congress and the public.
Some of the more noteworthy events are summarized below:
10 August 1973 - Reporters Morely Safer and Mike Wallace
.
of CBS's "60 Minutes" gave a one-hour
presentation which highlighted nuclear
theft and its consequences during
television's prime time.
7 November 1973 - A General Accounting Office (GAO)
study reported to Congress on the
inadequacy of the AEC's program of
protecting special nuclear material.
7 April 1974 - Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards
by Willrich and Taylor was released.
The report to the energy Policy Project
by the Ford Foundation examines the
possibilities of nuclear theft.
12 April 1974 - The GAO, in a report to Congress on
the adequacy of protection afforded
nuclear material in transit, chastised
the AEC for its inadequate measures.
30 April 1974 - "The Special Safeguards Study" (the
Rosenbaum Report) was placed in the
Congressional Record by Senator Ribicoff.
The report which was contracted by the
AEC found that safeguards were inadequate
as were new regulations, that the level
of risk associated with nuclear theft
was unacceptable, and that immediate
steps should be taken to reverse an
untenable situation.
Finally, on 11 October 1974, the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974 was signed into law. This act dissolved the
Atomic Energy Commission and replaced it with the Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
.
Although House and Senate Committees were interested
in the functioning of the AEC for some time, these reports
did much to foment legislative action which led to the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.
18

The Act, among other things, charged the NRC with the
regulation of all licensed activities associated with the
processing, transportation and handling of special nuclear
material. In order to insure that the "conflict of inter-
ests" problem would not reappear, the Commission has been
made completely independent of the ERDA. Also, an Office
of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards was established
which reports directly to the NRC. The purpose of this office
is to assess safeguard threats, recommend regulations and set
up programs designed to protect against theft and sabotage.
Since it is the central actor in the safeguards issue, the
NRC will frequently be discussed with regard to its actions
and regulations.
B. METHODOLOGY
In order to draw some substantive conclusions regarding
the credibility of nuclear theft from the U.S. nuclear power
industry, it will be beneficial to proceed by trying to answer
or at least investigated five areas.
The first task will be to identify those products of the
nuclear power industry which could be used to make a nuclear
weapon of some kind. Secondly, it will be important to
examine the nuclear fuel cycle - This "cycle" is made up of
various industrial processes required to generate electrical
Special nuclear material can be held by organizations
under government contract to ERDA, in which case it comes
under ERDA regulation, or by private industry in which case
it is licensed and regulated by the NRC.
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energy from a nuclear power reactor. Only by examining these
processes can some determination be made regarding the sus-
ceptibility of nuclear material to theft.
Having determined what nuclear materials can be used in
a nuclear weapon, during what portions of the fuel cycle they
are most susceptible, the study will turn to a discussion of
weapon construction, or how difficult is it to produce a
crude nuclear device?
Since the safeguard issue plays such an important and
controversial role in assessing the problem of nuclear theft,
considerable emphasis will be given to this portion of the
study. The safeguard regulations emphasized will be those
which are applicable to the most vulnerable portions of the
nuclear fuel cycle.
The final portion of the text will attempt to evaluate
the threat posed to special nuclear material. Its purpose
is to isolate and discuss those groups and individuals who
not only appear to have sufficient resources to successfully
steal fissionable material but appear to be suitably motivated,
as well. The threat portion of this study was undoubtedly
the most demanding of the several areas investigated; the
results are, also, the least certain due primarily to the
imprecision associated with assessments of motivation. How-
ever, it is hoped that when coupled with the foregoing portions




II. FISSIONABLE PRODUCTS OF THE
NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY
In the following section, it will be useful to identify
those fissionable products of the nuclear power industry
which could be used as the core material in a fission weapon
by an enterprising individual or group. The discussion con-
cerns itself with fission weapons only. This is due to the
fact that fusion weapons are generally an order of magnitude
more sophisticated with regard to money, technology and
materials required. In fact, a fission weapon or "trigger"
is required to create the heat necessary to permit the fusion
of light nuclei, thus forming heavier atoms and releasing
"thermo-nuclear" energy. Therefore, what is required of
the fission weapon is, in a limited sense, also required of
the fusion weapon.
Not all industrial nuclear materials are suitable to
produce a fission explosion. The essential ingredient is
that the material be capable of sustaining a fission chain
7
reaction, i.e., the material must contain an isotope that
is fissionable by neutrons of all energies (see figure 1)
.
Glasstone, S., ed. , The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,
p. 21-23, United States Atomic Energy Commission, April 1962.
The term "isotope" refers to one of two or more atoms
with the same atomic number (the same chemical) but with
different atomic weights. Thus, U 2 ^ 8 and U 235 are both
elements of uranium but are different isotopes because their
atomic weights differ slightly.
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During the fission process, two to three new neutrons must
be released in order to sustain the reaction. Essentially,
three things can happen to these neutrons: 1) the neutrons
can be captured by a suitable nucleus and thereby cause
another fission event; 2) the neutrons can escape the surface
of the material and be lost to the process; 3) the neutrons
can be absorbed by a non-fissionable nucleus and be loss to
the process. If it happens that neutrons are lost at a faster
rate than they are produced by fission, there can be no self-
sustained chain reaction. Consequently, in trying to produce
a fission explosion there must be an effort to inhibit the
loss of neutrons. This can be achieved in several ways.
Since one way for neutrons to escape is through the sur-
face of the fissionable material, the loss rate is a function
of the surface area, while the production rate is determined
o
by the mass. So, by increasing the volume of the fissionable
material, the ratio of neutrons lost compared to those produced
becomes smaller. This directly bears on the concept of
"critical-mass" which corresponds to the amount of material
required such that more neutrons are produced than are lost.
9
Thus, the number of fissions build tremendously.
Another way to restrict the number of neutrons lost is
by providing some type of reflector around the surface of
o
Op. Git., Glasstone, p. 16-17.
q
Reese, W. , Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,
unpublished class notes presented at the Naval Postgraduate
School, p. 1-4, 1975.
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the material, thereby bouncing the neutrons back into the
core and increasing the likelihood that another fission will
occur.
Still another means of restricting neutron loss would
be to purify the fissionable material being used in order to
reduce the probability that a given neutron will be absorbed
by a non-fission element. Both of these methods tend to
reduce the amount of material required to form a critical-
mass.
The critical-mass of the material used must be small
enough to suit the needs of the bomb designer. Some isotope
concentrations may require so much mass to be critical as to
be non- transportable by other than extraordinary means.
Consequently, the quantity of fission material required to
produce a nuclear explosion varies according to the type and
purity of the material utilized. For the purposes of this
discussion there are three widely used materials which lend
themselves to use as fission explosives. They are plutonium-
23 9, uranium highly enriched as the isotope 23 5, and uranium-233.
All three of these materials are used extensively in the
nuclear energy industry and are subject to transportation
and storage during their individual processing cycles.
Neither plutonium nor uranium-233 exist in nature.
Uranium- 235 composes only about .7% of uranium in its natural
state. Consequently, these materials must be manufactured
(in .the case of uranium it must be enriched) . The most im-
portant producer of these materials was the nuclear weapons
industry; however, this position is being yielded to the




Plutonium is a material generated in nuclear reactors
which utilize uranium- 238 to sustain a controlled fission
reaction. The neutrons released in the fission process must
pass through a moderator which reduces their speed and in-
creases the likelihood that they will be captured by the
uranium- 238, thus forming uranium- 239. This unstable isotope
eventually decays to become neptunium- 239 which in turn decays
to relatively stable plutonium- 239. The entire process of
decay requires only a few days (see figure 2) . This type
of reactor can also produce plutonium-240 in limited quanti-
ties; however, the plutonium-240 isotope cannot be used alone
in a fission device. In fact, plutonium-240 tends to degrade
the fission process because of its tendency to pick up another
neutron (thus becoming plutonium- 241) without fissioning.
Unfortunately, plutonium (a mixture of plutonium- 239 and
plutonium-240) remains quite feasible when used as the core
material for a small yield weapon (kilotons) . The advantages
of using plutonium as the fissionable material in a nuclear
weapon are substantial. Extensive shielding is not required
since plutonium-239
,
plutonium-240 and plutonium-241 emit
only alpha particles and beta rays which have relatively
insignificant penetration characteristics. Therefore,
during the period of the greatest danger to the perpetrators
(the act of stealing this material) , no shielding precautions
11 Taylor, T. B. and Willrich, M. , Nuclear Theft: Risks
and Safeguards
,









would be essential. Furthermore, only four to ten kilograms
of plutonium are required to constitute a critical-mass,
depending upon the chemical form, the type weapon and type
1
2
of neutron reflector utilized in the weapon construction.
The disadvantages to using plutonium for the construction
of a fission weapon are that when inhaled plutonium consti-
13tutes an extreme hazard. Minute amounts can cause death.
Adequate protection is afforded by wearing mask-type filters
and gloves. Any introduction of plutonium directly into the
14body (cuts, respiratory system) will cause grave problems.
Another disadvantage to the use of plutonium as the core
material of a fission weapon stems from the fact that plu-
tonium- 240 tends to fission spontaneously, thus introducing
the possibility of predetonation.
In addition to the metallic forms of plutonium mentioned
above, plutonium oxide and nitrate can be used to produce a
nuclear fission device. Plutonium oxide can be used directly
as the core material, and plutonium nitrate requires some
additional refinement. However, the processes required are
readily available in unclassified publications and do not
constitute major problems for a chemist or other technically
capable persons who would construct a weapon from this material.
ibid .
Cohen, B. L., "Hazards in Plutonium Dispersal," P. 10,
Institute for Energy Analysis, March 1975.
14




Another source of fissionable material available as a
result of the nuclear energy industry is highly enriched
uranium (high concentrations of uranium- 235) . When compared
with plutonium, uranium- 235 in a relatively pure state (90%)
provides an inefficient but workable fission core material.
Uranium- 235 is most frequently seen in its metallic, carbide
or oxide chemical forms. All can be used directly as the
core material of a fission device. Uranium hexafloride, a
gaseous form, is often used in the enrichment process. It is
easily convertible to the metal or oxide form. The advantages
of using uranium- 235 stems from its relatively non- toxic
qualities. No shielding or particular care in handling is
required. Furthermore, unlike plutonium-240 , uranium-235
does not release neutrons spontaneously in other than super-
critical configurations, thus reducing the possibility that a
home-made nuclear weapon would detonate prematurely. The dis-
advantage to using this isotope as the core material for a
fission weapon lies in its inefficiency. If not pure or
nearly so, many types of theft would be all but eliminated
due to the size and weight of the required material.
C. URANIUM-233
The final isotope to be discussed is uranium-233 , the
product of nuclear reactors which use thorium in the fission
process. In the reactor core, neutrons bond with thorium- 232
Enrichment beyond 20% is all that is technically
required; however, tremendous quantities would be required
to assemble a critical mass.
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to form thorium- 233 . The decay of this substance results in
protactinium- 233 which again decays within four weeks or so
to become the stable isotope uranium- 233. Besides uranium- 233,
other isotopes are formed in this process --uranium- 234 which
acts similar to plutonium- 240 and uranium-232. Uranium-232
decays further and in doing so emits gamma rays which are of
concern to the handler. However, the quantities of gamma
rays released are not so great as to be lethal without pro-
longed (days) exposure. Uranium-233 is similar to uranium-235
in many respects including the means of changing its state
(nitrate, oxide, metallic). Unlike uranium-235, it is extremely
efficient as a nuclear explosive material. In fact, only
slightly more U-233 is required to form a critical-mass than
is the case with plutonium. Its advantages stem from the
fact that it is efficient and relatively non-toxic. Its
disadvantage lies in the fact that U-232 is never separated
in the nuclear fuel cycle. Consequently, shielding during
periods of prolonged exposure is required.
16
Op. Cit.,, Taylor, p. 18.
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III. FUEL CYCLE VULNERABILITY
It should be clear that any of the three fissionable
materials discussed in the previous section (referred to as
"special nuclear material") are suitable for use as the core
17
material of a nuclear weapon. One of the most alarming
prospects facing the United States (and indeed, the world)
is the rapid increase in the quantities of special nuclear
material (SNM) which will be produced by the nuclear power
industry in the near future. As of March 1974, the AEC
estimated that there was approximately 250,000 pounds of
weapon-grade nuclear material in some phase of the nuclear
fuel cycle. In one year's time, 346 individual shipments
18
of SNM were made in weapon-size quantities (63,000 lbs).
It is estimated that in 1975 alone the U.S. will produce
1913,200 lbs. of plutonium. As a result of efforts to
peacefully harness nuclear power, it is expected that the
amount of available fissionable material will quadruple in
17
This study used the terms "special nuclear material"
and "fissionable material" synonymously. Both terms refer
to plutonium, uranium- 233, or uranium enriched in the iso-
tope 235 to a level greater than that found naturally.
Lanouette, W. J., "Homemade Nukes: Closer Than You
Think," The National Observer , V. 39, p. 3, 16 March 1974.
19 Lotts, A. L., and others, "The Status of Thermal
Reactor Fuel Manufacture in the United States," Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy, V. 8, p. 201, 1972.
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the next ten years and the current generation of light water
reactors alone will produce 60,000 lbs. of plutonium per
20year.
In order to determine where the special nuclear material
is most susceptible to theft, it is necessary to examine the
U.S. nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear fuel cycle is made up
of the industrial operations required to generate electrical
energy from a nuclear power reactor. It brings together a
number of processes including uranium mining, milling, chem-
ical conversion techniques, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrica-
tion, use in the reactor, and waste disposal.
A. HIGH TEMPERATURE GAS-COOLED REACTOR
There are three types of reactors that are of present and
near term importance to the U.S. nuclear power industry. The
high temperature gas-cooled graphite reactor (HTGR) contributes
only about 0.33% of the country's nuclear power generating
capacity, although this percentage should increase by a factor
of ten by 1980. Even though there is only one active HTGR
21power reactor in the U.S., the HTGR could be a significant
future contributor to the overall nuclear theft problem be-
cause of the type of nuclear materials used and produced in
the reactor core. The HTGR uses highly enriched uranium
(90-95% uranium-235) in conjunction with thorium during the
20 Phillips, J. G., "Energy Report/Safeguards, Recycling
Broadens Nuclear Power Debate," National Journal Reports
,
p. 420, 22 March 1975.
21
"World List of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News
,
V. 18, p. 63, August 1975.
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fission process. Neutron capture by the thorium results in
the production of uranium- 233 . This process is being studied
intensely because the uranium- 233 can be recycled. Uranium
recycle, although economically advantageous, will have an
unfavorable effect on the effort to adequately protect nuclear
material. At the present time, however, the HTGR fuel cycle
is "self protected" from theft because the uranium is highly
diluted with graphite, and it is in a form difficult to con-
vert into an explosive. Unfortunately, by 1980 production
of HTGR fuels may differ in several important respects,
22
making theft feasible. The most important difference may
be the complete separation of uranium- 235 and thorium, thereby
making a small portion of the HTGR fuel cycle vulnerable to
the theft of nuclear material directly useable in the core
23
of a fission weapon.
B. LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER REACTOR
The liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) appears to
be the U.S. nuclear power industry's choice as the power source
of the future. Already having consumed over 1.8 billion
dollars in research and development funds, an estimated 8
billion dollars will have been spent on this technology by
the early 1980' s yielding a potential 1.6 trillion dollar
22
U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration
Report At (49-l)a- 3665, LDC Nuclear Power Prospects, 1975-
1990; Commercial, Economic and Security Implications
,
Richard J. Barber Associates, Inc. , 19 75
.




economic benefit. At the same time the "breeder" reactor
will contribute vast quantities of plutonium to the SNM
supply, thus further aggravating the problem of safeguard-
ing nuclear material. The following excerpt from an AEC
environmental impact statement should give the reader some
insight into the scope of SNM proliferation problem in the
not too distant future.
"Plutonium would come into increasing use with the
...introduction of the LMFBR. In the year 2020, about
550 LMFBR electrical generating stations (averaging
4000 MWe each), about 28 fuel fabrication plants, and
about 28 reprocessing plants could be in operation. In
the same year, there might be about 5000 metric tons of
fissile plutonium present in the U.S. LMFBR fuel cycle,
about half of which would be in the reactors. The
extent of future plutonium product transportation
between facilities would be strongly influenced by
facility siting practices; assuming a dispersed industry,
about 100,000 shipments (highway and rail) might be made
in the year 2020.
"
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As implied by its name, the LMFBR will be capable of
"breeding" more fuel that it consumes in the fission process
By utilizing plutonium and natural or depleted uranium- 238
(uranium with as little of the uranium- 235 isotope as pos-
sible) as fuel in an unmoderated reactor core, more neutrons
are captured by the uranium- 238 than cause the plutonium
fuel to fission. The result is the production of more
plutonium- 239 than is used up in the reactor.
Facts on Nuclear Proliferation: A Handbook , Congres-
sional Research Service Library of Congress, p. I"85, U.S.
Government Printing Office, December 1975.
United States Atomic Energy Commission, Proposed




The fuel cycle for the breeder will remain uncertain for
some time to come; however, it should be similar to the LWR
plutonium recycle fuel flow with regard to vulnerability.
Plutonium oxide should be available in strategic quantities
during the final portion of fuel reprocessing, storage, the
first phase of fuel fabrication and the transportation links
which join these processes.
C. LIGHT WATER REACTOR
Although there are several types of reactors in use in
the United States, the light water reactor (LWR) is by far
the most numerous and is likely to remain so through the
1980's. In the interest of clarity it will be useful to
develop a generalized LWR fuel cycle (see figure 3)
.
The LWR fuel cycle begins with the mining and milling
of uranium ore. The product which leaves the milling site
is called yellow cake or uranium oxide. The yellow cake
is transported to a conversion plant which changes the
uranium from a solid to a gaseous state (uranium hexafloride)
suitable for enrichment. The enrichment process takes place
at a gaseous diffusion plant where the uranium hexafloride
is enriched to approximately 2-4% uranium-235. This level
of enrichment is far too low to be used in a crude fission
weapon. Once enriched, the uranium must be converted back
to an oxide form. At the fuel fabrication plant the uranium
oxide is molded into the small pellets which when combined
make up fuel rods. Large numbers of these fuel rods are
packaged into fuel assemblies for use in the reactor core.
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The fuel assemblies are shipped to the reactor site by truck
in huge metal containers which may weigh from three to four
tons. This fuel will usually be placed in storage at the
reactor site while waiting for spent assemblies to be removed
from the reactor.
During the process of irradiation in the reactor core,
most of the uranium-235 will undergo fission, and at the same
time quantities of plutonium- 239 will be formed (uranium- 238
will capture a neutron and decay to become the stable isotope
plutonium- 239) . Some of this newly formed plutonium will
also undergo fission. When the uranium-235 is depleted to
less than 1%, the spent assemblies will be changed and after
a "cooling" period at the reactor site the spent fuel will be
shipped to the reprocessing plant (usually by rail) . This
fuel is now highly radioactive and must be shipped in gigantic
containers which range in weight from about 25 to 70 tons.
At the reprocessing plant the assemblies are allowed to cool
further. Finally, the radioactive waste is separated from
the plutonium and uranium through a chemical process. The
depleted uranium must be returned to an enrichment facility
since the uranium-235 now represents less than 1% of the
total amount of uranium separated. The plutonium which is
separated is in the form of a nitrate solution. When "plu-
tonium recycle" commences, it will be converted to plutonium
oxide, shipped to the fuel fabrication facility and used to
form part of the fuel for the LWR. The conversion of
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plutonium nitrate to oxide before shipment will serve to
aggravate the safeguards problem because plutonium oxide
can be used directly in a fission weapon and plutonium ni-
trate must be converted to a more appropriate form. However,
this program has not yet begun and most of the plutonium
produced thus far has been stored either at fuel fabrication
plants or at special storage facilities.
An examination of the generalized fuel cycle presented
in figure 3 reveals some salient features regarding the
potentialities of theft of fissionable material from the
nuclear power industry. The most obvious feature is that
to a significant degree, during much of the fuel cycle the
SNM is "self protected." During the mining, milling, pro-
duction and enrichment portions of the LWR fuel cycle, the
uranium- 235 never constitutes more than about 4% of the
uranium fuel (20% and above is considered weapons-grade)
.
In fact, without plutonium recycling the only worrysome por-
tions of the fuel cycle are in the final processes conducted
by the fuel reprocessing plant, transportation to a storage
facility, and at the storage facility itself. The reason
for this is that before it becomes a part of the core of a
light water reactor, there is no weapons-grade material
available, and after its introduction to the reactor it
becomes highly radioactive and is shipped in the massive
containers mentioned previously.
However, as plutonium recycle becomes a part of the LWR
fuel cycle, the portions of the cycle which are vulnerable
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to theft will increase dramatically (see figure 4) . The
reasons for the increase in vulnerability are as follows.
Plutonium now leaves the fuel reprocessing plant in the form
of a nitrate solution. It is shipped in containers to a
storage facility where it remains in liquid form. Plutonium
nitrate cannot be directly used as the core material for a
fission weapon; first it must be converted to an oxide or
metallic form. Consequently, those who would steal plutonium
nitrate would have to acquire the requisite laboratory equip-
ment, techniques and take the proper precautions in order to
complete the conversions themselves. (The fact that the
plutonium is in an inconvenient form may or may not hinder
the illicit development of a nuclear weapon. This would
strictly be a function of the adversary's resources and
capability.) On the other hand, when plutonium recycle
begins on a large scale, plutonium will probably be converted
to an oxide form at the reprocessing plant. Plutonium oxide
can be used directly as the core element of a nuclear weapon.
The reasons this conversion will be made are primarily due
to the requirements of the fuel fabrication plant which use
plutonium oxide to form the fuel pellets , but it has been
suggested that from a safety point of view oxide presents
less of a spillage problem should there be an accident in
transit. The result is that sizeable quantities of plutonium
in a form which can be used directly as the core material
of a nuclear weapon will have to be shipped from reprocessing
plants to fabrication plants. With the advent of plutonium
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recycle, the portions of the fuel cycle most vulnerable will
include the later stages of fuel reprocessing, shipment to a
plutonium storage area (if required) , the plutonium storage
area, shipment to the fuel fabrication plant, and the process
of fuel fabrication. This increase in the use and availa-
bility of plutonium has caused considerable clamor. Anti-
nuclear power groups around the country have seized upon the
plutonium recycle issue to arouse public and governmental
interest in the overall expansion of the U.S. nuclear power
program. The consequence of this interest is yet to be fully
determined; however, there have been some concrete examples
of the effectiveness of these groups. The two most notable
examples are the creation of ERDA and the NRC to replace the
Atomic Energy Commission and the California Nuclear Initiative
which will be on the June 8, 1976 ballot. One possible out-
come of that ballot could be to seriously limit the growth




Given that the desired fissionable material is available
in the appropriate form and quantity and that it is suscept-
ible to theft, what are the possibilities for constructing a
crude fission bomb or even a radiological dispersal device?
There is wide variation among the experts as to just how
"easy" either undertaking would be, but the important point
is that most agree it can be accomplished by non-national
groups and organizations. There are several reasons for this
concensus. The first and perhaps most important reason is
that there has been widespread publication of precise instruc-
tions pertaining to the construction of nuclear weapons,
conversion of plutonium and uranium to metal forms, associ-
ated safety precautions and the like. An example of the type
and depth of information available to an illicit design team
is taken from an ARPA study prepared for the Defense Supply
Service.
"[Special nuclear material] is generally not in metal
form but must be converted into metal with the physical
shapes and dimensions that are required by the device
designed; however, this task can be done. The technology
of all necessary chemical conversion processes has been
described in significant detail in the unclassified liter-
ature. Two compendiums would be especially useful for the
production team. These are Reactor Handbook , Second Edi-
tion, Revised § Enlarged, Interscience Publishers, Inc.,
New York, and Plutonium Handbook, A Guide to the Tech-
nology , 0. J. Wick, ed. , Gordon 8 Breach, New York, 1967.
The Reactor Handbook has information (theory and experi-
mental data) on common materials useful in device
construction (graphite, steel, beryllium, and so forth),
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shielding, neutron transport, nuclear constants, critical
experiments, manufacture of neutron sources, and techniques
of radiation protection as well as detailed information
on the processing of uranium and plutonium.. The Plutonium
Handbook has information on chemistry and chemical proces-
sing of plutonium, its metallurgy, its fabrication (casting,
extrusion, rolling, swaging, welding, machining) and health
and safety, including designs of safe facilities. The
sabotage group would apparently not need to engage in much
of a research and development program. In these and other
readily available documents, it has been spelled out for it
in detail and for almost all process steps the reagents,
temperatures, and other information necessary for efficient
production. It would need only to select, procure, and
install equipment and to conduct a brief series of shake-
down runs. "2b
Another cause for concern is that a growing number of
people have now worked closely with the design, development,
production and operation of nuclear weapons. In fact, "the
number of persons worldwide who are considered to have the
technical expertise necessary to manufacture a crude nuclear
27bomb is estimated to be in the tens of thousands." Conse-
quently, there are a number of qualified persons who feel
that the construction of a crude nuclear device is well within
the capabilities of a few persons and possibly even one person
(this has reportedly been accomplished by an MIT graduate
student) . Two noted authors in the field have made the
following assessment of the skills and non-nuclear resources
required to fabricate a nuclear weapon:
Advanced Research Projects Agency Report 1141, The
Unconventional Nuclear Threat - A preliminary Survey (U)
,
by E. M. Kinderman, T. B. Taylor, and W. R. Van Cleave,
p. 83-84, Secret, May 1969.
27 Jenkins, B. , Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? , Rand
Corporation, p. 3., May 1975.
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"As a result of extensive reviews of publications
that are available to the general public and that relate
to the technology of nuclear explosives, unclassified
conversations with many experts in nuclear physics and
engineering, and a considerable amount of thought on the
subject, we conclude:
Under conceivable circumstances, a few persons, pos-
sibly even one person working alone, who possessed about
ten kilograms of plutonium oxide and substantial amount
of chemical high explosive could, within several weeks,
design and build a crude fission bomb. By a "crude fis-
sion bomb" we mean one that would have an excellent chance
of exploding, and would probably explode with the power
of at least 100 tons of chemical high explosive. This
could be done using materials and equipment that could
be purchased at a hardware store and from commercial
suppliers of scientific equipment for student labora-
tories .
The key persons or person would have to be reasonably
inventive and adept at using laboratory equipment and tools
of about the same complexity as those used by students in
chemistry and physics laboratories and machine shops. They
or he would have to be able to understand some of the essen
tial concepts and procedures that are described in widely
distributed technical publications concerning nuclear
explosives, nuclear reactor technology, and chemical ex-
plosives, and would have to know where to find these pub-
lications. Whoever was principally involved would also
have to be willing to take moderate risks of serious injury
or death.
Statements similar to those made above about a pluton-
ium oxide bomb could also be made about fission bombs made
with high-enriched uranium or uranium-233. However, the
ways these materials might be assembled in a fission bomb
could differ in certain important respects.
We have reason to believe that many people, including
some who have extensive knowledge of nuclear weapon tech-
nology, will strongly disagree with our conclusion. We
also know that some experts will not. Why is this a
subject of wide disagreement among experts? We suspect
that at least part of the reason is that very few of the
experts have actually spent much time pondering this
question: 'What is the easiest way I can think of to make
a fission bomb, given enough fission explosive material
to assemble more than one normal density critical mass?'
The answer to this question may have little to do with
the kinds of questions that nuclear weapon designers in
the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
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France, or Peoples Republic of China ask themselves when
they are trying to devise a better nuclear weapon for
military purposes. But the question is likely to be
foremost in the mind of an illicit bomb maker.
Whatever opinions anyone may have about the likelihood
that an individual or very small group of people would
actually steal nuclear materials and use them to make
fission bombs, those opinions should not be based on a
presumption that all types of fission bombs are very dif-
ficult to make. "28
A. METHODS OF BOMB CONSTRUCTION
One of the fundamental problems associated with the
development of a nuclear weapon is to bring two or more sub-
critical masses of fissionable material together to form a
super-critical mass, or to compress a sub-critical mass to
a point necessary to achieve super-criticality . Furthermore,
the material must be brought together or compressed very
rapidly, and it must remain in a super- critical configuration
for as long as possible. In order to accomplish the super-
critical formation of fissionable material, at least two
basic geometries have been employed.
1. Gun Geometry
Gun-type geometry is the most elementary method of
configuring a super-critical mass of fissionable material.
Since it is also the least efficient method, it would appeal
to the group or individual that had a large quantity of
fissionable material but very little complementary talent
or experience. Gun geometry physically separates two
28
Op. Cit., Taylor, p. 20-21.
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sub-critical masses of fissionable material. When detonation
is desired, one mass is fired down a guide-tube. at a second,
stationary sub-critical mass surrounded by tamper. Usually
both impact surfaces are coated with elements which, when
they meet and mix, release a pulse of neutrons that assure
29initiation of the chain reaction. (See figure 5).
2 . Implosion Geometry
The implosion method of weapon construction is a much
more efficient design than the gun geometry, but it also
demands much more sophistication on the part of the design
team. The implosion geometry uses a sphere of fissionable
material surrounded by a tamper which is in turn surrounded
by a sphere of high explosives. Initiators, which are placed
at the center of the core, become mixed when the core is
compressed. The compression of the core and tamper is
achieved by the formation of an inwardly produced shock wave.
The shock waves , which are formed by the detonation of the
spherically-shaped explosives, must arrive at the core
simultaneously to achieve the required compression. An
encyclopedia article by Joyn S. Foster describes the process:
"A simple picture of this so-called implosion technique
can be gained by imagining a sphere of fissionable material
and tamper which is slightly below critical. Under these
conditions, a neutron born in the central region of the
fissionable material has almost an even chance of producing
a fission before it leaves the metal. If the assembly is
now compressed to twice the original density, the radius
is then reduced to about 8/10 of its initial value. A
neutron leaving the central region under the compressed
29 Glasstone, S., Sourcebook on Atomic Energy , 3rd ed
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conditions must pass through atoms which are more closely-
spaced by a factor of two, although the. total distance is
reduced only 20 percent. Consequently, the chance of
causing a fission is actually increased by approximately
2 x 0.8, or 1.6 times. The assembly is now obviously very
supercritical, although only one critical mass was used.
The trick, of course, is to compress to several times
normal density the mass of fissionable material and tamper.
This requires pressures above 10 million pounds per square
inch. Such pressures can be developed through the use of
high explosive. The nuclear core could be placed in the
center of a large sphere of high explosive. Compression
of the fissionable material is attained by lighting the
outer surface of the high explosive simultaneously at some-
thing like 100 points spaced roughly evenly over the surface,
The procedure produces a roughly spherical, in-going deton-
ation wave which, on striking the metal core, provides the
necessary compression to lead to a nuclear explosion. "30
(See figure 6).
3 . Comparison of Methods
The differences between the gun and implosion design
lead to some important tradeoffs which would profoundly affect
the capability of certain groups to construct nuclear weapons.
As mentioned previously, the gun geometry is a relatively
simple design requiring very little in the way of sophisti-
cated design practices. The price which is paid for design
simplicity, however, is inefficiency. Consequently, the
group plagued with a lack of resources (money) and talented
membership in weapon construction would ostensibly be forced
to adopt the gun geometry design. As a result, the risk
involved to the group would probably go up because of the
larger quantity of SNM required. On the other hand, a group
or individual with either resources or an abundance of talent
30 Foster, J. S., "Nuclear Weapons," Encyclopedia
Americana, V. 20, p. 520-522, Americana Corporation, 1973.
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has the best of both worlds; the implosion technique would
require less fissionable material and achieve a higher
explosive yield at a lower level of risk.
B. RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND DISPERSAL DEVICES
Little time will be devoted to the discussion of radio-
logical weapons and dispersal devices because they use SNM
so ineffectively. Although a rather insidious radiation
weapon could be fashioned with less than a kilogram of SNM,
and a few grams of plutonium dispersed in the air-conditioning
system of a large office complex could kill or injure hundreds
and leave the building useless for a prolonged period, there
are less risky and more destructive means of accomplishing
similar ends. In fact, "arson, scattering of chemical or
biological poisons, or chemical explosive could produce equal
or more destructive effects, in many cases, with less effort."^-'-
Furthermore, if a group possessed, for example, a kilogram of
plutonium, it could very likely be sold for enough money to
fund many acts equally destructive to society. Or the material
could be used to make a nuclear threat more credible. For
example, the " Liberation Army" could research the
available unclassified literature in order to formulate a
credible nuclear weapon design consistent with the grade of
plutonium it possessed. A copy of the design and a sample
of the plutonium could then be sent to the Governor of
California requesting two million dollars in small bills and
31 Willrich, M. , ed. , International Safeguards and Nuclear
Industry
,
p. 191, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
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air transportation out of the country. If the demands were
not met, the group could threaten to detonate an (actually
non-existent) nuclear weapon in downtown Los Angeles, San
Diego, Sacramento or San Francisco.
Even though it does not seem logical that an organization
or group would steal plutonium or other radioactive material
for the purpose of constructing a radiological weapon or
dispersal device, a well thought out plan may include using
the material in this manner, i.e., hold the material hostage
in the event that the group was caught in the act. For
example, upon stealing plutonium from a storage area, one
of the first acts undertaken by the thieves may be to attach
high explosives to the plutonium containers. In this manner,
the group has something to bargain with if they are compro-
mised by law enforcement officials during the commission of
the theft. The extent of their bargaining power would probably
depend on many factors, the foremost of which would be the
population density in the surrounding area. One can imagine
some circumstances under which their original demands would
be met even though the plot had not been fully carried out.
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V. PRIMARY METHODS OF SAFEGUARDING
FISSIONABLE MATERIAL
A. OVERVIEW
The primary objective of the nuclear safeguards program
is to protect the public from injury, death or property damage
as the result of the theft of special nuclear material. To
do this, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must be concerned
with the prevention, detection, recovery, and response to the
theft of nuclear material. Along these lines, the Commission
has undertaken a "federal security agency" study which was
mandated by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. The pur-
pose of the study is to assess the need for, and feasibility
of, creating a federal security agency which would be charged
with the safeguarding of special nuclear material. Although
the study has not been completed at this time, it does not
appear that the creation of a federal security force will be
requested of Congress. If this is, in fact, the outcome of
the study, the Commission will again be confronted by critics
of the nuclear power program who feel that not enough is being
done in the safeguards area.
The previous examination of the nuclear fuel cycle revealed
three major avenues of theft available to those with the
requisite motivation and resources: nuclear diversion, theft




Nuclear diversion, as the term is used here, implies that
the theft is clandestine. In this situation an employee (or
some other person with access to fissionable material) of a
fuel fabrication plant or reprocessing facility would conspire
with others or act alone to smuggle small quantities of
nuclear material from the plant/facility over a period of
time. Under the present system of safeguards, material con-
trol and accountability are the key deterrents to diversion.
Material controls refer to those measures undertaken by the
plant or facility to ensure that the SNM remains within the
controlled area, i.e., it is not smuggled out by an employee.
The chief means of material control are plant surveillance
techniques, restrictions which limit access to SNM to author-
ized persons only, personnel searches at exits from controlled
areas, and the use of electronic devices at controlled area
exits which are able to detect minute amounts of SNM. In the
latter case, electronic inspections are made of all persons
exiting a material access area. "The [NRC] Regulatory Guide
suggests that the detection equipment used should be capable
of detecting 0.5 grams of 90% enriched uranium, shielded in
each case by brass and concealed anywhere on a person's
body." The consequence of this regulation is significant.
If the diversion were attempted by one individual, it would
take him on the order of 8,000 - 20,000 exits to assemble a
32 Op Cit. , Taylor, p. 93
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critical- mass of plutonium, and each day he would be risking
detection. One other drawback to these safeguarding regula-
tions is that the means of inspecting vehicles that must enter
controlled areas is not prescribed. The NRC has left the
precision with which a vehicle is searched up to each licensee.
Since a critical inspection of each vehicle and packages within
the vehicles may take an inordinate amount of time, a licensee
may be inclined to allow cursory inspections.
Accountability is the other prime method used to deter
the diversion of special nuclear material. Accountability
(material accountancy) is based on three practical measures.
Physical inventory, the first, is simply the measurement of
nuclear materials on hand at a given point in processing.
Usually this is the amount of material received in shipment.
The second measurement is referred to as materials unaccounted
for (MUF) . This is the difference between the amount of
material that underwent processing at the outset (physical
inventory) and the material obtained in the final inventory,
plus or minus additions or removals. The final measurement
is the statistical construction of a confidence interval
(goodness of fit) to determine the reliability of the MUF.
The licensee is then required to keep precise records which
accurately document the quantities of material being processed,
that which has been transferred, etc. In the case of the
chemical reprocessing plants, the limit of error on material
unaccounted for (LEMUF) is 1.0% for plutonium and uranium- 233
and .71 for uranium enriched in the U-235 isotope; .51 is the
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limit of error for materials in other facilities. The
impact of these regulations has been dramatized repeatedly
in the past. A Kerr-McGee conversion plant employee stated
that in the past the company had on several occasions been
unable to account for as much as 60 pounds of plutonium.
In 1966, a plant in Apollo, Pa. was unable to account for
35220 pounds of enriched uranium. "Theoretically, at least
2,500 pounds of special nuclear material could have disap-
peared from licensees' inventories already without being
7
f.
detected." The problems that the MUF process has caused
are twofold. In the event of a real threat or a hoax, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission would most likely be unable to
deny the likelihood of fissionable material in the hands of
the perpetrators. This inability could be of tremendous sig-
nificance during a bomb threat or ransom demand situation.
The obvious drawback to material accountancy is that while
it may serve a beneficial deterrence function, it does very
little to detect the thief who was not deterred. The Rosenbaum
study concluded that "it will be necessary to direct the
accountability effort not toward computing an overall balance
as it now is, but toward the detection of diversion. We recom-
mend that the current concepts of MUF and LEMUF be abandoned
33
Op. Cit. , Lanouette, p. 3.
34 Burnham, D. , "U.S. Says Lost Plutonium is 'Only Small




Op. Cit., Lanouette, p. 3.
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as a basis of safeguards and that they be replaced by a
different kind of accounting and measurement system..."
C. THEFT OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FROM STORAGE AREAS
The nuclear material storage area is another vulnerable
portion of the nuclear fuel cycle. Here, we include temporary
storage areas associated with fuel fabrication and reprocessing
plants in addition to areas used strictly for storage. In
some studies of theft in the nuclear industry the vulnerability
of storage areas has been underestimated. Perhaps the primary
reason for this lack of attention stems from the fact that
there are a number of NRC safeguards required of each storage
facility. But while there are safeguards required, there are
also enough ambiguities within the regulations to render these
measures ineffective under some circumstances.
Basically, the physical security regulations can be summar-
ized as follows. All plants that wish to be authorized to
hold strategic quantities of nuclear fission materials must
propose a physical security plan which conforms to the NRC
physical protection requirements. Each plan is therefore
individualized by each licensee. All approved plans are held
confidentially and not released to the public or competitors.
Several of the more important NRC requirements have been listed
below:
- Double barriers to access (fences)
- Access controls (monitored gate)
- Entry and exit searches
- Intrusion alarms
United States Atomic Energy Commission, Special Safe
guards Study [The Rosenbaum Report] , Rosenbaum, D. M. , and
others, p. 3, April 1974.
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- Trained and armed guards
- Communication capability with local law enforcement
agencies
- Theft response plan
All of these listed requirements must be included in the
licensee's physical security plan. Fissionable nuclear mater-
ial is to be housed within a concrete, steel or brick building
referred to as a "material access area." When this area is
unoccupied it must be alarmed with electronic equipment.
Fissionable material not "in process" must be housed in a
3 8
vault-like room. Since "in process materials" are not
specifically defined, the criteria for what material must be
vaulted and what can be left out is ambiguous. Around each
material access area is a "protected area." This barrier is
designed to serve as a buffer. It must be enclosed by an
eight-foot fence with barbed wire strung around the top. All
gates are required to be equipped with alarm systems. The
outer perimeter of the fence is to be buffered by an "isola-
tion zone" which amounts to an unpatrolled area of unrestricted
view, thus depriving potential thieves of a hiding place
immediately adjacent to the fence. (See Appendix B)
.
The plant must form a security protection force made up of
guards (armed)
,
patrol watchmen (can be armed in emergencies)
,
and/or watchmen (unarmed) . It is noteworthy that until recently
the AEC (now the NRC) did not prescribe the size, physical
requirements, training or equipment of the force. Further-
more, it did not delineate overall organizational standards
A vault- type room is defined as a room with locked
doors and an alarm system to detect entry.
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or the gamut of possible threats against which the security
organization might; expect to be confronted. Each guard or
watchman was to have some method of communication with a
central alarm center which was to be continuously manned.
The center was to be capable of dispatching a reserve force
and alerting local law enforcement officials of the situation.
In order to achieve communication with the local law enforce-
ment group, the center was to be equipped with a telephone and
two-radio radio communications.
In November of 1973, the AEC issued regulations which are
essentially still in effect except for several revisions.
Although there is still no size requirement, the new regula-
tions prescribe how the licensee's guards and watchmen are to
be trained, equipped and qualified. Furthermore, the Commission
made the following statement concerning the scope of training
and the potential threat:
"The general training program should be adequate to
help assure that the licensee's guards and watchmen are
capable of providing protection of the facility against
sabotage or SNM from theft, either in transit or at a fixed
site, until arrival of assistance from law enforcement
authorities. The following potential sources of threats
should be considered in the training program:
a. Lone individuals familiar with the construction
and operation of the facility or the routing of vehicles
transporting SNM;
b. A group of several individuals, some of whom may
be armed with weapons such as rifles, sidearms, and
explosives
;
c. A group of unarmed individuals engaged in dis-
orderly conduct or mob activities." 39
9 United States Atomic Energy Commission, Regulatory Guide
"Training, Equipping, and Qualifying of Guards and Watchmen,"




In addition to more or less defining the goals of train-
ing, a ten-day general training program, a three- to five-day-
facility or carrier training programs and an arms qualifica-
tion program are included. In April 1975, these programs were
expanded slightly to give greater emphasis to the "Points of
Law" and "Security Skills" sequence. Table I shows the general
increasing level of protection afforded special nuclear mater-
ial since 1973.
Nevertheless, many critics of the Commission continue to
find the regulations lacking. For example, the threat state-
ment quoted above differs markedly from most evaluations of
the maximum credible threat. In the case of the Rosenbaum
Safeguards Report, a study contracted by the AEC , it was
estimated that "the maximum credible threat to any facility
or element of transportation handling special nuclear mater-
ials is fifteen highly trained men, no more than three of
which work within the facility or transportation company from
which the material is to be taken. We believe that the
'insiders' can include anyone up to the higher levels of
management of the organization involved." Quite obviously,
there is an order of magnitude difference between the size of
the force projected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
the force projected by the Rosenbaum Report. There is also
considerable discrepancy between critics and the Commission
Larson, H. J., "Pivotal Safeguard Issues Viewed by the
NRC," paper presented at the Institute of Nuclear Material
Management 1975 annual meeting, New Orleans, LA, 20 June 1975.
41 U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Peaceful
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regarding the type of equipment thieves would use. The
Regulatory Guide fails to mention the possible use of silenc-
ers, automatic weapons, light anti-tank weapons and other
weapons which are becoming relatively common to the underworld
and are quite a bit more sophisticated than "rifles and side-
arms .
"
Furthermore, the training program does not provide scenarios
for diversion or possible methods persons might use to conceal
special nuclear material. No classes are given on illicita-
tion, intelligence gathering capabilities of an opposing force
nor are there training periods required with the shotgun and
rifle.
Other criticism stems from the overall generality of the
guidelines. With the exception of the "Arms Qualification
Program," the licensee is free to interpret the Regulatory
Guide as he sees fit. Consequently, the licensee could imple-
ment a dynamic, aggressive security force, or he chould choose
to take numerous shortcuts which would meet requirements but
result in an ineffective security force. Some critics would
argue that the problems which beset this entire group of fixed
site safeguards stem from a lack of specific regulations force-
fully implemented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A
dramatization of how lax safeguards procedures can become is
demonstrated by the example of a plutonium storage facility
isolated in a wooded area of upstate New York:
"The facility is a steel, windowless, rectangular
building about 80 by 160 feet. It is surrounded by a
chain link fence that is seven feet high and about fifty
60

feet from the building exterior. Trucks carrying ship-
ments of plutonium pull into an unloading dock inside the
building. There workers unload the shipping containers
with the help of a small crane. They remove the steel-
jacketed plastic containers, each containing 2.5 kilograms
of plutonium in solution, and insert them into special
storage containers... Outside normal working hours, there
are no individuals at the site. The building and some of
the interior points, however, have alarms designed to send
signals to a central point in the general vicinity of the
site. ASDA [New York State Atomic and Space Development
Authority] officials have expressed confidence that armed
law enforcement authorities would appear at the facility
within 'a very short time' [after the alarms have been
sounded] ."42
Given that the electronic alarm works and is not by-passed by
the intruders, and that a small law enforcement contingent is
alerted, would they be a match for a dozen organized terrorists
with automatic weapons and a good plan?
D. NUCLEAR HIJACKING
The protection of special nuclear material in transit has
particular importance to this discussion because it is widely
regarded as offering the most potential for the theft of fis-
sionable material. Nuclear shipments are most vulnerable
during the period when they are transported from the fuel
reprocessing plants to the fuel fabrication plants. During
this period the nuclear material is generally in a form which
is either directly useable in the core of a fission device,
or it is at least easily converted to an appropriate form.
In addition, it is relatively light and poses no great radia-
tion hazard. The methods used for transportation are rail,
truck, air and sea. The methods of transportation most
42
Op. Cit. , Taylor, p. 37.
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pertinent to this discussion are truck and air, although rail
and sea should not be discounted altogether as potential areas
of theft. No doubt British Rail Officials felt that rail
security measures were very effective against theft until one
of its trains arrived at its destination on 8 August 1963,
seven million dollars lighter. Or in the case of shipping,
it would not be too difficult to imagine a ship being hijacked
by a crew which is made up almost entirely of third world
nationals. Since the ship carrying SNM need not be U.S., this
particular possibility is even more believable.
On the other hand, rail and sea methods of transportation
present serious obstacles to a group of hijackers. Both
restrict the variety of "getaway techniques" that can be used,
and both would usually demand that the fissionable material be
43transferred from the original carrier soon after the seizure.
Although immediate transfer of the material may not be much of
a burden, it tends to reduce the alternatives available to the
thieves
.
The hijacking of special nuclear material while being
transported by truck presents a very serious problem in the
It is easy to imagine that if a plane or truck carrying
fissionable material were hijacked, the adversaries might
decide to use the carrier as the escape vehicle. The material
would not have to be removed until a "safe house" or "safe
area" was reached. However, if a train is to be used as the
escape vehicle, thieves are restricted to the original direc-
tion of travel and, of course, to the tracks themselves. This
would seem to demand that the material be physically removed
from the train (unless the object of the theft was to hold the
SNM hostage). In the case of a ship, the thieves are restricted




United States. There is little question that most government
and industry officials regard this transportation link as the
weakest in the nuclear fuel cycle. The substantiations for
this conclusion are fairly obvious. It is no secret that
hundreds of commercial carriers are hijacked each year. These
thefts have resulted in the loss of an estimated 1.2 billion
dollars worth of material goods. The role of organized crime
in the trucking industry and its labor union has been widely
publicized and well documented.
In an effort to counter this threat, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has implemented a series of regulations which are
designed to provide 'assurance that a theft cannot be success
-
44fully carried out short of a significant armed attack."
Exactly what is meant by a "significant armed attack" is appar-
ently clarified by Appendix C, discussed previously, i.e.,
"A group of several individuals, some of whom may be armed
with weapons such as rifles, sidearms and explosives." Again,
it should be pointed out that this estimate of the maximum
credible threat is in sharp contrast to the Rosenbaum Report,
among others.
45
Licensees who presently wish to ship strategic quantities
of SNM by truck must insure the security of the nuclear mater-
ial. It is interesting that the trucking firm itself need not
be licensed by the NRC. Specific regulations pertaining to
shipment by road can be summarized as follows: All shipments
44
Op. Cit. , Taylor, p. 94.
45 Strategic quantities is defined as 5 Kgs uranium-235
(20% enriched or greater) or 2 Kgs uranium-235 or plutonium.
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by road must be direct and the route must be preplanned.
There can be no intermediate loading or unloading. Trucks
must carry a radiotelephone and are required to communicate
frequently (two to five hours) with the licensee or his
agent. There must be two persons in the vehicle with the
shipment, either two drivers or one driver and one other
authorized person. Physical protection of the truck can take
one of two forms. The first method is to have two persons in
a vehicle designed to "permit immobilization of the van and
provide barriers or deterrents to physical penetration of the
46
cargo compartment." The alternative method is to utilize
an armed escort consisting of two guards in a separate vehicle,
Escort vehicles are also equipped with radiotelephone capable
of continuous radio communication with the van. There is one
potentially significant exception to these methods. If the
shipment requires an average time of one hour or less, only
a driver is required in the vehicle containing special nuclear
material
.
Taylor and Willrich point out that the first method does
little to deter an employee theft and the second method does
little to deter a non-employee theft since the armed escort
47
could be intercepted before the hijacking took place. The
communication requirements tend to increase the problem for
46 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rules and
Regulations, Title 10 CFR, Part 73, "Physical Protection of
Plants and Materials," Section 73.31.
47
Op. Cit. , Taylor, p. 96.
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a potential thief; however, these requirements do little more
than demand that the hijackers rehearse their procedures and
execute the plan swiftly. And if the thieves have been able
to obtain the proper radio frequencies, any communication
could prove advantageous to the thieves.
Many authors of publications which address the problem of
nuclear theft have minimized the problem of hijacking a nuclear
cargo when transported by air. Presumably, this is because
there are stringent safeguards which apply to the shipment of
48SNM in a passenger aircraft. Cargo aircraft, on the other
hand, are almost totally unregulated when the entire flight
is intended to remain in the continental United States. The
only regulations which apply are those concerning the transfer
of nuclear material. During a scheduled transfer of SNM or
when some other material in the same cargo compartment is being
transferred, a guard must be present to insure that the SNM is
properly routed. Otherwise special nuclear material need
not be escorted when the cargo flight plans to remain within
the United States. There are, in fact, no physical protection
requirements to safeguard nuclear material while in an air
transit status * Furthermore, there is no screening of crews,
and there is no specification as to what types of aircraft
may be used.
4
- Op. Cit., 10 CFR part 73, Section 73.32, "No shipment
of special nuclear material shall be made in passenger air-
craft in excess of (1) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is
less, of plutonium or uranium- 233, or (2) 350 grams of






Assessment of Transportation Safeguards
Although this presentation of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's efforts to safeguard nuclear material has empha-
sized some of the shortcomings of that program, commendable
safeguarding efforts have been initiated in the recent past
and others are in the public comment stage of development.
Table II lists the substantive regulatory changes in trans-
portation safeguards. While there have been no significant
changes in the transport safeguards since 1974, Tables III
and IV present a group of additional protection requirements
being offered for public comment. If these safeguards are
eventually implemented, they would upgrade the overall trans-
portation safeguard program considerably. The proposed road
shipment protection requirements, for example, are particularly
impressive. The requirement for a special vehicle with a
separate escort vehicle carrying two guards would be desirable
from two viewpoints. First, it would seriously complicate a
non-employee attempt to hijack the vehicle. Secondly, it
would go a long way to frustrate an attempt at hijacking by
the special vehicle driver himself.
E. FEDERAL RESPONSE PLANS
Having taken up a discussion of the methods employed to










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a discussion of what response can be expected from govern-
mental agencies should a threat or hoax surface. A few years
ago there were no response plans, no coordination or dialogue
between agencies, no reaction mechanisms at all. In September
of 1972, however, President Nixon established a Cabinet Com-
mittee to Combat Terrorism, the function of which is to "take
the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our govern-
ment can take appropriate action in response to acts of
52terrorism swiftly and effectively." The working group,
which carries out the daily business of the Committee, meets
as a group every two weeks to discuss incidents and the oper-
ations of their departments. The group includes representa-
tives from ERDA, NRC, FBI, NSA, NSC, CIA, DOD, the Department
of State, Justice, Treasury, Transportation and other appro-
priate agencies. The working group formed the lines of
communication necessary for coordinated responses to acts of
terrorism. However, by Executive Order 11050, action was
taken to create a government-wide response plan for nuclear
emergencies. Under the authorship of the Federal Preparedness
Agency (FPA) , this document (the Federal Response Plan for
Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies --FRPPNE) is designed to provide
planning guidance for the preparation of federal, state and
local operational response plans to peacetime nuclear emer-
gencies (PNE's). Additionally, it is designed to facilitate
a complete and coordinated federal planning effort that would
52 Nixon, R. M. , Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism ,
The President's Memorandum to the Secretary of State on the
Establishment of the Committee , 25 September 1972.
70

meet all PNE contingencies. Under this plan, the NRC is now
responsible for developing operational plans for the federal
response to nuclear incidents which, without preventative
action, could result in the detonation of a weapon or wide-
spread contamination. Although the response plan itself has
not been promulgated by the NRC, Commission officials feel
that a coordinated response is presently within the capability




The purpose of this section is not to determine the
vulnerability of nuclear material or to question the" adequacy
of existing safeguards, but rather, it is to isolate and
discuss those groups and individuals who not only appear to
have sufficient resources to steal fissionable material but
appear to be suitably motivated, as well. It is only by
deriving the potential threat that any assessment can be made
regarding the qualitative probability that a theft of special
nuclear material can or will occur. First, it will be impor-
tant to define operationally what is meant by the term
"threat." Threat is defined as the capability of an individual
or group to illicitly seize and maintain control of a signifi-
cant quantity of fissionable material.
A. CAPABILITY
A precise definition of "capability" in quantified terms
is well beyond the scope of this study; however, by using two
significant variables it should be possible to develop a strong
appreciation for different levels of capability which can be
brought to bear by one group or individual as compared with
others. The two most important variables appear to be
resources and motivation.
1 . Resources
The resource variable is the broadest of the two cat-
egories used to assess an individual or group's capability to
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steal fissionable material successfully. The resources can
include such things as material assets, access to SNM, access
to intelligence-related information, education, training and
skills. A few selected examples of specific resources that
could (but not always do) improve an individual or group's
capability are listed below:





Access to SNM - Manager of a fuel fabrication plant
- Vital area employee
- Truck driver for SNM shipment
- Air crewman for SNM air cargo shipment




- Almost any facility employee
Education - Degree in Nuclear Physics
- Degree in Engineering




- Navy SEAL, Special Forces or Marine
reconnaissance experience
- Civilian or military training in
nuclear weapons.
It should be relatively obvious that the extent to which the
above resources would improve a group's overall theft capa-
bility depends precisely on the type of theft, the plan, the
group membership, and so on.
2. Motivation
Perhaps the most important aspect of any threat
evaluation is motivation; in this case, what impulse would
73

incite anyone to try to steal fissionable material? To
examine this question, it is useful to consult figure 7.
The motivational spectrum presented certainly does not address
all of the fundamental forms of motivation, i.e., survival,
desire for the basic material needs, etc.; however, it does
come to grips with motivation on a very basic level, and it
seems to cover the motivational spectrum functional in con-
ventional threat analysis. The reader will notice that the
spectrum seems to extend from the tangible achievements asso-
ciated with financial gain to some very intangible achievements
associated with personal or group frustration. Examples of
criminal activity which are instigated by a desire for finan-
cial gain or frustration can range from a wife who kills her
husband to collect on his insurance policy to Sirhan Sirhan's
53
assassination of Robert Kennedy "out of love for Palestine."
Both people have committed criminal acts against society.
The first crime is committed for a tangible reward- -money
;
but it is difficult to determine what tangible achievement
could be expected from the assassination of Senator Kennedy.
The spectrum is in some sense continuous, i.e., there
are those motivated by a combination of impulses, for example,
political change and financial wealth. Consequently, they
could be plotted somewhere along the line between economic and
political motivation. Some examples of the type of motivation
and possible corresponding groups or individuals are given:
53 Bell, J. B., Transnational Terror , p. 11, American

















Class Group/ Individual Incident Motivation




Criminal Mafia Drug Economic
trafficking
Subversive Soviet Communist Theft of Ideological
war plan
Psychotic Arthur Bremer Shot Gov. Extreme
Wallace frustration
B. MORPHOLOGICAL APPROACH
In order to get some comparative "feel" for the candidates
who appear to have the best capacity to steal fissionable
material, it was decided to use a morphological approach to
54problem solving similar to that professed by Fritz Zwicky.
This method was chosen early in the research phase when the
author was confronted with the considerable problem of com-
paring resources. For example, if a five-man terrorist group
attacks a storage facility, what increase in group capability
would be yielded by the addition of one well-armed man? What
is the increased capability if the additional man happens to
be an employee?
The morphological approach seemed to offer a method of
systematically examining all possible levels of capability
as a function of group size and classification (see figure 8)
.
Because the system can theoretically examine all possibilities,
it is an extremely powerful technique. Of course, it is also
54 Zwicky, F. and Wilson, A. G., ed. , New Methods of
Thought and Procedure
,
















































































this "power" which makes it an extremely tedious operation.
Consequently, the size of a group was allowed to range over
several numbers to simplify the operation. Instead of in-
creasing the size of the group by one each time, reasonable
group sizes were formed, i.e., one individual acting alone,
two to four individuals, five to seven individuals, etc.
The morphological approach did not indicate much change
with regard to increased capacity for success resulting from
an increase in the size of a particular group. If a group's
size was increased from an average of nine to an average of
eighteen members, no change in capability could be discerned.
It was obvious that the group's resources increased consider-
ably but so did the chances that the operation would be
compromised. The result was that common sense had to be
applied liberally during the grading and evaluation stages
of comparison.
Analysis which was based on the type (classification) of
thief resulted in clear and useful correlations. Of particular
note was the increase in capability possible if, for example,
organized crime and employees were to participate together in
an operation. Categories were formed according to the three
principle types of theft discussed previously, i.e., diversion,
theft of nuclear material in storage and hijacking. Hijacking
was separated into its most vulnerable carrier methods, truck
This three-man grouping method was not used steadfastly.
For example, the breakpoint in the size of the employee classi-
fication seemed to be between two and three. Two employees




and air. Resources were then listed which could be of impor-
tance to the individual or group carrying out the theft.
Although there are other resources which would be helpful in
the conduct of a nuclear theft, it is felt that those resources
itemized would make a significant contribution to a successful
theft or diversion. These theft resources could certainly be
expanded to include others; however, too many resource cate-
gories would demand specific operation plans in order to
analyze threat. Following the list of useful resources is a
list of constraints which if not satisfactorily counterbalanced
by the resources, tend to detract from the credibility of an
operation.
The particular constraints used were "potential for
violence," "opportunity," and "technological ability." Al-
though the three constraints used were judgementally applied,
they were very useful in narrowing the field of serious can-
didates. The concept of "potential for violence" is a phenomena
referring to the likelihood that one group or individual would
be more inclined to use a significant level of force in order
to carry out a theft than another group or individual.
Two nuclear power industry scientists might conclude, for
example, that the proliferation of fissionable material caused
by the expansion of the nuclear power industry would destroy
society as we know it. Their solution is to steal "special
nuclear material" to dramatize the danger the world faces.
The question arises, however: would these scientists be
willing to use "deadly force" in the commission of the crime?
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Would they be willing to eliminate one or two uncooperative
guards? Would a group of terrorists, in comparison, be
willing to use "deadly force" in the commission of a similar
crime? It would appear that the scientists would be more
constrained than terrorists, and that constraint tends to
detract from the credibility that a violent type of theft
would be carried out by the scientific group. On the other
hand, the scientific group would be much better qualified to
divert SNM successfully.
Another constraint- -opportunity- - is a fairly straight
forward concept referring to the degree of access the
perpetrator(s) has to SNM. The third constraint used deals
with the perpetrator 's (s
'
) technical ability to carry out
those procedures required for the construction of a weapon.
Although not specifically subdivided, this category includes
educational background as well as material assets and skills
unrelated to those required for the theft itself. Some
examples are an advanced degree in nuclear physics or engin-
eering, a laboratory, a machine shop, laboratory and machinist
skills
.
By employing the morphological approach in this manner,
the author was able to review and discard a tremendous number
of theft candidates without resort to mathematical operations.
Some tacit assumptions were made which profoundly effect the
The ability to perpetrate a hoax or sell the material
on the black market, etc., is more or less given to all
candidates, although these possibilities are discussed more
critically further along in the study.
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apparent capabilities of the groups. In the second example
presented in figure 8, the two plant employees are given credit
for having knowledge and access to accountancy procedures, a
knowledge of plant processes and a knowledge of the surveil-
lance measures used by the plant. Obviously, not all plant
employees have access to this type of information. The
assumption is that the employees occupy key positions. Simi-
larly, the third example assumes that the five to seven crim-
inals have the backing of a large organization and can draw
upon its resources. It is also assumed that such an organi-
zation would be in a position to enlist the assistance of an
appropriate employee of the trucking industry. Justification
for this assumption is addressed under the motivation segment.
The outcome of the morphological- type analysis has been
to narrow the field of candidates down to a few of the more
capable groups. The flaw with this type of selection process
is that the selection of groups is almost completely resource-
oriented. Because an organization has the resources necessary
to conduct a successful theft does not mean that it will be
motivated to try. Motivation must be discussed at length with
the individual candidates for theft systematically analyzed.
C. GROUPS WITH SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY
TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR THEFT
1. Employee Theft
A nuclear theft by one person acting alone does not
seem especially credible for any of the types of theft pre-
sented. Although it appears that certain employees could come
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quite close to carrying out the theft single-handedly, the
assistance of at least one other person would upgrade the
credibility of the theft considerably. A reprocessing plant
manager, for example, has tremendous potential in the area
of diversion. He has access to accountancy records and could
very likely confuse accurate accounting measures beyond
rectification. He usually has direct access to SNM and can
probably bypass at least a few plant regulations by virtue of
his position. If the plant properly enforces a "two-man rule,"
however, the manager would have to enter into collusion with
another employee. Consequently a most credible diversion
scenario can be built upon collusion between two reprocessing
plant employees, one of which is in a managerial position with
57
considerable authority and access to accountancy figures.
Both would need access to SNM. There are problems associated
with the theft of nuclear material by two employees which are
greater than those encountered by other groups. Since there
are only two persons, they must possess all of the requisite
knowledge and skills needed to perform the theft and construct
the weapon. The foregoing conclusion should be handled with
care because the two thieves could sell the material to a
black market of some kind or ransom the nuclear material, but
either one of these options might well take more imagination
5?.. .-.
Op.' Cit. , Willrich, M;
, p. 13. As mentioned previously,
it is, conceivable that the diversion has taken place to some
extent. Witness the following- -"There have been a. few bad
experiences with management in the United States. Although
there has been no evidence of diversion, there have been a few
cases where amounts of material have disappeared that were far
above reasonable errors that could result from technical
difficulties of operation or analysis or accounting."
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than the theft itself. In the case of the black market, they
would require a "fence" and would have to use some imaginative
scheme to protect themselves during the payoff period. In
the case of ransom, they would be faced with the problem of
collecting the money without being detected by law enforcement
agencies, a risky proposition at best.
For this type of theft, financial gain appears to be
the most likely motivational force although other possible
motivational factors range from a desire for wealth to mental
instability. It is not comforting to know that embezzlement,
a concept very similar to diversion, is undertaken by financial
institution employees every year. If there is any doubt that
there are employees in the nuclear fuel industry properly
motivated to steal fissionable material, the following quote
should dispel that doubt: "To date, there have been a few
reported losses of strategic material, although only one is
said publicly to have involved an attempted theft.... In
Bradwell, England, two reactor plant workers dropped 20 fuel
rods over the plant fence and left them, apparently to be
5 8picked up." Fortunately, the theft was intercepted.
2. Theft by Terrorists
The threat that terrorists pose to nuclear material,
or at least the perceived threat, is to a large extent
responsible for the new clamor for the tightening of nuclear
safeguards. The phenomenal increase in anti-social behavior
c o
Shapley, D. , "Plutonium: Reactor Proliferation Threatens
a Nuclear Blackmarket ," Science, p. 68, 9 April 1971.
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is demonstrated by the air piracy example. Between the years
of 1948 and 1958 there was an average of 2.1 hijackings per
year. By 1963, the average had risen to 3.3 per year.
Despite the convening of international conferences to curb
air piracy, the world average had increased to 7.2 hijackings
per year by 1968. Two years later this figure zoomed to an
unprecedented level--50.5 successful air piracy operations per
59
year. Perhaps even more distressing than the hijackings
themselves were the associated activities: indescriminate
murder, outrageous demands, and the slow reaction of the
governments around the world to cope with the phenomenon. To
a large extent, the terrorists' capability to inflict damage
upon society stems from the destructive power of new sophis-
ticated, man-portable weapons, the vulnerability of complex
technologies and social sub-systems, and the unpredictability
of terrorist targeting procedures. An example of the problems
associated with checking terrorist activity is demonstrated in
the following quote from "The Ecology of Terrorism":
"...it is extremely difficult to predict and prevent attacks
such as the 'Kamikaze' one launched at Lydda airport, pri-
marily because the rationale of the predators was totally
alien to the environment assaulted* Kozo Okamoto stated
to the military court in Jerusalem which tried and convicted
him for the Lydda butchery that he and his companions acted
in order to promote 'the World Revolution'. He added that
both the executioners and their victims, 'united in death',
would be reincarnated as stars, and that their joint illum-
ination would shed 'eternal peace on earth'. A political
tragedy incorporating mystic symbolism with compulsive
ideologized violence, executed according to an ancient,
Bushido Code, in a modern airport which is both geograph-
ically and culturally remote from Japan is--to say the
least— difficult to foresee." 60
59 Segre, D. V. and Adler, J. H. , "The Ecology of Terrorism,"





Partially because of instances similar to that quoted
above, terrorists (a miniscule proportion of the population)
have become very effective in making a given option appear
more desirable to major portions of society or at least forc-
ing society to consider different options. This has been
achieved chiefly through a technique referred to as "random
terror." Random terror is incomprehensible to most members
of society primarily because the selection of those to be
killed, maimed or otherwise incapacitated is left to relatively
chance factors, e.g., a bomb tossed into the midst of a crowd
at a sporting event. Society, unable to rationalize this type
of action, becomes more fearful and the terrorists hope more
amenable to the demands of a numerically insignificant portion
of society. Should terrorists become equipped with nuclear
weapons, the impact of successful terrorist acts on the public
would be incalculable. The consequences could certainly
jeopardize society as we know it.
Terrorists unquestionably pose a credible threat to
the nuclear power industry. The reasons for this are numerous.
Since terrorists are usually ideologically or politically
motivated, they would most likely ascribe their efforts to
the quest for a "greater good." As such, their determination
is likely to be more substantial and the level, of acceptable
risks greater than those seeking monetary gain. Because ter-
rorists would primarily seek political change , their ransom
could be in the form of governmental concessions. In this
manner, the group would never be required to retrieve money
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which could lead to their eventual capture. Furthermore,
terrorists have in the past displayed the means of acquiring
substantial sums of money, automatic weapons, and explosives.
In light of events similar to those which occurred at the 1972
Olympic Games, it would appear that terrorist groups are capable
of executing bold and surprising action quite a bit more prob-
lematic than the hijacking of a nuclear material vehicle.
At least from a resources and violent potential point
of view, terrorist organizations seem to be well qualified
nuclear theft candidates; however, there is considerable dis-
agreement regarding their motivation to commit nuclear theft.
It is argued that with the tremendous advances in weapons
designed for the individual, due mainly to miniaturization,
"a new range of small, portable, easy to operate, highly
accurate, and highly destructive weapons are coming into
existence... [These types of weapons] can be employed as
effectively against civil aircraft, super-tankers, motorcades,
and speaker's podiums as against military targets." Because
these new weapons give terrorists such a tremendous ability
to inflict harm on society, there is no need for them to
undertake the complex and risky operation of stealing fission-
able material in order to build a nuclear weapon. In fact,
detonation of a nuclear weapon by terrorists, killing
thousands, could prove dysfunctional to their cause.
Fearey, R. A., Terroristic Activity, International
Terrorism , hearings before the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee
of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 14 May 1975.
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"After all, had they wanted to, terrorists could
already have done a number of things which could pro-
duce widespread casualties. Apart from the technical
difficulties involved, which are less than those involved
in putting together an atomic bomb, why haven't terrorists
threatened to contaminate a city's water supply? Cer-
tainly there must be some constraints, other than technical
ones, against killing thousands. There are, of course:
to begin with, moral ones. Despite the popular view of
them, terrorists, for the most part, are not wanton
killers. There are also practical arguments against mass
murder. Killing a lot of people is seldom an objective
of terrorism. High body counts do not necessarily further
their objectives, and can provoke a damaging backlash. "52
Although the Jenkins argument makes a certain amount
of sense, there are some very solid reasons for thinking that
some terrorist groups would be overjoyed at the prospects of
acquiring fissionable material and/or a nuclear weapon. The
basic objectives of terrorism seem to be to gain publicity,
to instill fear in the public, and to drive the government
into a policy of repression which will eventually undermine
its middle-of-the-road support. The theft of fissionable
material would almost certainly contribute to the achievement
of these goals. The mere mention of the words "radioactive,"
"nuclear" or "atomic" would create a climate of fear unprece-
dented in this country. The "media" would insure unprecedented
publicity, and the U.S. Government would be forced to react
in an unprecedented manner- -a manner deemed offensive to many,
perhaps unconstitutional to some, but necessary. Furthermore,
there are terrorist organizations probably willing to use a
nuclear weapon. Small terrorist groups which have few
Jenkins, B. M. , High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate
War: The Impact of New Technology on Low-Level Violence ,
p. 11, Rand Corporation, January 1975.
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inhibitions and have no constituency to alienate would be
particularly dangerous. A member of the Manson Family was
willing to try to assassinate a President. This miniscule
group of social failures has threatened death to those who
pollute the earth. Would such radicals be willing to detonate
a nuclear weapon at a General Electric plant to dramatize their
point? Fissionable material is one of the very few items in
the world that would offer immediate publicity, create fear
in the public, cause untold problems for the government and
at the same time be a saleable commodity after all demands
had been met. Lastly, there are terrorists which have as
their objectives the demise of all nuclear power programs.
Would a nuclear theft suit their objectives?
3 . Theft by Criminal Organizations
From a resource point of view, organized crime clearly
poses a threat as credible as that for political terrorist
organizations. Criminal organizations have the financial
backing required to support extensive training exercises; the
political influence is there if required; forged documents are
easily obtained; sterile (untraceable) weapons are available;
and procedures for moving personnel and material across borders
clandestinely have been long established. In the case of a
truck hijacking, trucking employees may be under the influence
of organized crime. Evidence of criminal influence in the
trucking industry was revealed by Wright, Long and Company
after the completion of an extensive study contracted by the
AEC. The study determined that "on a list of 735 so-called
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Mafia members, 12 are or were the owners of trucking firms,
two are truck drivers and at least nine were union officials."
While talking to the Atomic Energy Commission at a Los Alamos
safeguards conference, truckers agreed that organized crime
could quite easily obtain nuclear material if they so desired.
"Anything that organized crime wants to lay its hands on, while
64it's in the transportation cycle, it's going to get."
The overriding motivational force for criminals would
seem to be monetary gain. In this regard, a well organized
group would probably be more willing to sell the material
through a black market operation than to risk capture by con-
structing a weapon itself and demanding a ransom. However,
Willrich and Taylor point out that "organized crime" might be
willing to construct a weapon and hold it as hostage, thus
placing itself beyond the reach of the law. This type of
hostage alternative has very little face validity, however,
in that large prospering organizations would probably view
the risks involved as outweighing the gains. Should the
deterrent value of the constructed weapon for some reason fail
to deter law enforcement agencies, the organization would be
forced to either use the weapon or back down. In either case,
the organization would probably be destroyed and the whole
operation would, prove self-defeating.
United States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington
Conference on Transportation Safeguards, 2 October 1969.
See also Los Alamos Safeguards Conference proceedings,
WASH 1147, p. 21-38.
64
Op. Cit., Shapley, p. 19.
65 Op. Cit. , Taylor, p. 112.
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It seems much more likely that organized crime would
become involved in the creation of a fissionable material
black market for sale abroad. Although the going rate for
plutonium is $10,000 per kilogram, this price would undoubtedly
skyrocket as the demand developed and the material realistic-
ally became available, making it a fantastically lucrative
affair. Various authors have argued, however, that organized
crime is too conservative to become involved with the theft
of material that can be illicitly used to construct atomic
bombs. Since decision makers in this type of criminal group
are thought to be affluent, their stake in society is likely
to be quite large. Nuclear weapons in the hands of private
individuals could cause revolutionary changes in law, law
enforcement, and public opinion that could destroy ordinary
criminal organizations as a byproduct of nuclear safety.
On the other hand, organized crime may be forced into
the nuclear theft business in order to survive. It is felt
that some "families" did not want to get into the drug business
on moral grounds. But because of the vast sums of money to
be made, it was decided that the competition would use in-
creased revenues gained from the sale of drugs to force the
non-drug families out of business.
In addition to "organized crime," it can be argued
that a nuclear theft could be initiated by a group of criminals
less interested in the societal consequences of their actions.
This type of group would probably be organized for the sole
purpose of committing the nuclear theft and would then disband.
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Many major thefts have been conducted in this manner, some
requiring as much as two years in the planning and rehearsal
stages. In addition to common equipment and weapons, law
enforcement officials are beginning to see the use of sophis-
ticated electronic equipment utilized to neutralize alarm
systems, radio monitoring devices, silenced weapons, gas
grenades and the like. The fact is that many major crimes





This study was undertaken with a few biases in mind.
Initial research included the reading of many sensationalist
articles, critical reports by the Government Accounting Office,
the Rosenbaum Report, and the Taylor book. The author's
personal feelings after the initial research were that the
public should take a closer look at the whole nuclear power
program, that regulatory safeguards were generally inadequate,
that governmental bodies administering the safeguards were not
fully effective, that the construction of a weapon would be
relatively easy, and that some type of federal security agency
was required to protect special nuclear material. It is not
surprising that the most widely publicized articles drew
pessimistic conclusions proving perhaps that sensationalism
sells magazines and books. Hopefully, the following conclu-
sions will merit a little more consideration than those
initially formed.
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
It is becoming apparent to many in this country that the
need for additional substantive nuclear safeguards is clear
and present. As discussed earlier in this essay, thousands
of pounds of fissionable material are in some stage of pro-
duction or storage in the United States alone. This material
is required as fuel for over 60 nuclear power plants presently
operating. By 1980 it is expected that there will be in excess
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of 150 nuclear power plants in operation. These plants will
require at least three times the fissionable material pres-
ently being stored and transported. Clearly, the potential
for nuclear theft will not abate in the foreseeable future
due to a lack of material.
It should be just as obvious that there are periods during
the nuclear fuel cycle when nuclear materials present a lucra-
tive target for persons sufficiently motivated to commit a
nuclear theft. The unfortunate fact is that we appear to have
several groups who meet the motivational criteria. An alarming
but realistic conclusion is that not only do criminal groups
and terrorists have the motivation necessary, but they have
repeatedly proven their capabilities to execute more adven-
turous enterprises successfully.
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
1. The Availability of Weapons-Grade Material
The availability of weapons-grade nuclear material is
presently low, but the situation will change drastically with
the advent of plutonium recycle. Although the decision as to
whether to allow plutonium recycle or not is still under review
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the decision will be
made in about eight months) , unofficial conversations with
Commission officials indicate that plutonium recycle will be
allowed to commence barring an unforeseen public outcry. The
reasons behind the pro- industry stance by the Commission stem
from a genuine feeling that safeguards can meet "private"
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threat projections (considered to be five well-armed men now,
and ten well-armed men in the near future).
The introduction of the liquid-metal fast breeder
reactor will increase the availability of weapons -grade nu-
clear material on the same order as plutonium recycle. If
both of these programs are realized, the influx in the avail-
ability of SNM will surely be phenomenal. Industry and
government acting in concert (which they rarely do) would be
hard-pressed to adequately protect the quantities of SNM
subject to shipping, storage, processing, etc. Even though
there are some palatable solutions to the issue of safeguards,
ft 7
their eventual acceptance is highly questionable.
2 . Weapon Construction
The construction of a nuclear weapon would appear to
be within the capability of numerous groups and organizations
with either the membership talent or the finances to procure
the talent. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that
a weapon can be constructed haphazardly or with little imagin-
ation or technical ability. On the other hand, the argument
is almost superfluous because anyone who has successfully
stolen a "bomb-size" quantity of SNM must be assumed to have
ft ft
This unofficial assessment is still considerably less
than the Rosenbaum Report's threat projection.
Two of the alternatives are: The introduction of a
nuclear park concept which would localize all fuel cycle
processes to the reactor site, thus eliminating shipment
of SNM and allowing industry to concentrate its security
expenditures on the protection of the park; the second alterna-
tive is to reduce the growth of nuclear power and turn to the
development of other sources of energy.
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the capability to construct a weapon. The capability must be
assumed especially in the ransom demand situation; it matters
little whether or not ERDA and the NRC are convinced that a
group of successful thieves can build a bomb, the point be-
comes, is the risk acceptable to the government-- to the public?
It seems that worst case analysis would have to be applied.
3. Safeguards Adequacy
Table I is representative of the substantial improve-
ment made in the area of nuclear safeguards over the past few
years. To be sure, the Commission and its predecessor, the
AEC, have been effective in lowering the risk to the public
associated with the theft of nuclear material. If the safe-
guards presently under consideration by the Commission are
implemented (see tables III and IV) , the risk will be reduced
even further. However, until such time as these and other
safeguards are implemented, several areas will remain in need
of attention. Those areas in need of particular attention
are the diversion or embezzlement of SNM by employees, employee
or non-employee-related hijacking of an air cargo shipment,
and the employee- related hijacking of an SNM shipment made
by truck. It is the opinion of this study that these forms
of theft remain highly credible and exceed a level of risk
thought to be generally acceptable.
4
.
Who Poses a Significant Threat
In contrast to several highly regarded studies of
nuclear theft, it is concluded that organized crime in concert
with nuclear industry or carrier employees pose the greatest
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threat to nuclear materials in non-hostage scenarios. Given
employee collusion, organized crime would appear to have an
abundance of resources enabling it to carry out any of the
most credible forms of theft cited above. Furthermore, it
is felt that demand for SNM (i.e., from third-world nations)
will create sufficient economic incentives to push organized
crime into a nuclear black market arrangement.
Terrorists seem to pose the greatest threat to SNM in
hostage- type situations; that is, in situations whereby material
is stolen overtly and held as hostage so that no arrests could
be made by law enforcement agencies without risking the dis-
persal of radioactive material. Subsequently, demands could
be made and so on. Although terrorists have in the past
displayed the means of acquiring substantial sums of money and
talent, most organizations probably do not have these resources
and must be satisfied with automatic weapons, explosives and
the execution of bold and surprising action. Taking plutonium
hostage would appear to serve a terrorist group well with
regard to publicity, bargaining power, and the creation of a
fearful situation.
The actual construction of a bomb by most terrorists
does not seem to be especially credible because of their rela-
tive paucity of resources and talent. Also, as Jenkins has
pointed out, it may not be altogether in the interests of a
terrorist group to explode a nuclear weapon which actually
kills thousands. The line of reasoning used by Jenkins is not
extremely compelling, and yet it has influenced the thinking
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of key government people from the State Department, the
Justice Department and the NRC. In fact, a substantial
percentage of the people interviewed in key Washington
agencies seemed to have adopted the attitude that safeguards
were being improved even though it was not really necessary.
In light of some of the unpredictable operations terrorists
have become involved with recently, it may not be wise to









93rd Congress, H. R. 11510
October 11, 1974
an act
To reorganize and consolidate certain functions of the Federal Government in
a now Energy Research and Development Administration and in a new Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in order to promote more efficient management of such
functions.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, Energy Reorga-
nization Act of
SHORT TITLE 1974.




— DECLARATION' OF PURPOSE
Sec. 2. (a) The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare 42 use 5801.
and the common defense and security require effective action to
develop, and increase the efficiency and reliability of use of, all energy
sources to meet the needs of present and future generations, to increase
the productivity of the national economy and strengthen its position in
regard to international trade, to make the Nation self-sufficient in
energy, to advance the goals of restoring, protecting, and enhancing
environmental quality, and to assure public health and safety.
(b) The Congress finds that, to best achieve these objectives, improve
Government operations, and assure the coordinated and effective
development of all energy sources, it is necessary to establish an
Energy Research and Development Administration to bring together
and direct Federal activities relating to research and development on
the various sources of energy, to increase the efficiency and reliability
in the use of energy, and to earn- out the performance of other
functions, including but not limited to the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's military and production activities and its general basic research
activities. In establishing an Energy Research and Development
Administration to achieve these objectives, the Congress intends that
all possible sources of energy be developed consistent with warranted
priorities.
(c) The Congress finds that it is in the public interest that the
licensing and related regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy
Commission be separated from the performance of the other functions
of the Commission, and that this separation be effected in an orderly
manner, pursuant to this Act, assuring adequacy of technical and
other resources necessary for the performance of each.
(d) The Congress declares that it is in the public interest and the
policy of Congress that small business concerns be given a reasonable
opportunity to participate, insofar as is posssible. fairly and equitably
in grants, contracts, purchases, and other Federal activities relating to
research, development, and demonstration of sources of energy effi-
ciency, and utilization and conservation of energy. In carrying out
this policy, to the extent practicable, the Administrator shall consult
with the Administrator of the Small Business Administration.
(e) Determination of priorities which are warranted should be based
on such considerations as power-related values of an energy source,
preservation of material resources, reduction of pollutants, export
market potential (including reduction of imports), among others.
On such a basis, energy sources warranting priority might include,
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Sec. 101. There is hereby established an independent executive
agency to be known as the Energy Research and Development
Administration (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the "Adminis-
tration").
OFFICERS
Sec. 102. (a) There shall be at the head of the Administration an
Administrator of Energy Research and Development (hereinafter
in this Act referred to as the ''Administrator") , who shall be appointed
from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. A person may not be appointed as Administrator
within two years after release from active duty as a commissioned
officer of a regular component of an Armed Force. The Administration
shall be administered under the supervision and direction of the
Administrator, who shall be responsible for the efficient and coordi-
nated management of the Administration.
(b) There shall be in the Administration a Deputy Administrator,
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
88 STAT. 1235
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(c) The President shall appoint the Administrator and Deputy
Administrator from among individuals who, by reason of their gen-
eral background and experience are specially qualified to manage a
full range of energy research and development programs.
(d) There shall be in the Administration six Assistant Adminis-
trators, one of whom shall be responsible for fossil energy,, another
for nuclear energy, another for environment and safety, another for
conservation, another for solar, geothermal, and advanced energy
systems, and another for national security. The Assistant Adminis-
trators shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The President shall appoint each Assistant
Administrator from among individuals who, by reason of general
background and experience, are specially qualified to manage the
energy technology area assigned to such Assistant Administrator.
(e) There shall be in the Administration a General Counsel who
shall be appointed by the Administrator and who shall serve at the
pleasure of and be removable by the Administrator.
(f) There shall be in the Administration not more than eight
additional officers appointed by the Administrator. The positions of
such officers shall be considered career positions and be subject to
subsection 161 d. of the Atomic Energy Act.
(g) The Division of Military Application transferred to and estab-
lished in the Administration by section 104(d) of this Act shall be
under the direction of a Director of Military Application, who shall be
appointed by the Administrator and who shall serve at the pleasure of
and be removable by the Administrator and shall be an active- commis-
sioned officer of the Armed Forces serving in general or flag officer rank
or grade. The functions, qualifications, and compensation of the
Director of Military Application shall be the same as those provided
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, for the Assistant
General Manager for Military Application.
(h) Officers appointed pursuant to this section shall perform
such functions as the Administrator shall specify from time to time.
The Administrator shall delegate to one such officer the special respon-
sibility for international cooperation in all energy and related envi-
ronmental research and development.
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(i) The Deputy Administrator (or in the absence or disability of Order of
the Deputy Administrator, or in the event of a vacancy in the office succession.
of the Deputy Administrator, an Assistant Administrator, the Gen-
eral Counsel or such other official, determined according to such order
as the Administrator shall prescribe) shall act for and perform the
functions of the Administrator during any absence or disability of
the Administrator or in the event of a vacancy in the office of the
Administrator.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
Sec. 103. The responsibilities of the Administrator shall include, 42 use 5813.
but not be limited to
—
(1) exercising central responsibility for policy planning, coordi-
nation, support, and management of research and development 38 stat.1235
programs respecting all energy sources, including assessing the 8S stat.1235
requirements for research and development in regard to various
energy sources in relation to near-term and long-range needs,
policy planning in regard to meeting those requirements, under-
taking programs for the optimal development of the various
forms of energy sources, managing such programs, and dissemi-
nating information resulting therefrom:
(2) encouraging and conducting research and development,
including demonstration of commercial feasibility and practical
applications of the extraction, conversion, storage, transmission,
and utilization phases related to the development and use of
energy from fossil, nuclear, solar, geothermal, and other energy
sources
;
(3) engaging in and supporting environmental, biomedical,
physical, and safety research related to the development of energy
sources and utilization technologies:
(4) taking into account the existence, progress, and results of
other public and private research and development activities,
including those activities of the Federal Energy Administration
relating to the development of energy resources using currently
available technology in promoting increased utilization of energy
resources, relevant to the Administration's mission in formulating
its own research and development programs :
(5) participating in and supporting cooperative research and
development projects which may involve contributions by public
or private persons or agencies, of financial or other resources to
the performance of the work
;
(6) developing, collecting, distributing, and making available
for distribution, scientific and technical information concerning
the manufacture or development of energy and its efficient extrac-
tion, conversion, transmission, and utilization;
(7) creating and encouraging the development of general
information to the public on all energy conservation technologies
and energy sources as they become available for general use, and
the Administrator, in conjunction with the Administrator of the
Federal Energy Administration shall, to the extent practicable,
disseminate such information through the use of mass communi-
cations;
(8) encouraging and conducting research and development in
energy conservation, which shall be directed toward the goals of
reducing total energy consumption to the maximum extent
practicable, and toward maximum possible improvement in the
efficiency of energy use. Development of new and improved con-
100

Pub. Law 93-438 October 11, 1974
servation measures shall be conducted with the goal of the most
expeditious possible application of these measures
;
(9) encouraging and participating in international coopera-
tion in energy and related environmental research and develop-
ment;
(10) helping to assure an adequate supply of manpower for the
88 stat. 1236 accomplishment of energy research and development programs,
88 stat. 1237 by sponsoring and assisting in education and training activities
in institutions of higher education, vocational schools, and other
institutions, and by assuring the collection, analysis, and dis-
semination of necessary manpower supply and demand data;
(11) encouraging and conducting research and development in










Sec. 104. (a) The Atomic Energy Commission is hereby abolished.
Sections 21 and 22 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42
U.S.C. 2031 and 2032) are repealed.
(b) All other functions of the Commission, the Chairman and
members of the Commission, and the officers and components of the
Commission are hereby transferred or allowed to lapse pursuant to
the provisions of this Act.
(c) There are hereby transferred to and vested in the Administrator
all functions of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Chairman and
members of the Commission, and the officers and components of the
Commission, except as otherwise provided in this Act.
(d) The General Advisory Committee established pursuant to sec-
tion 26 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2036) , the Patent Compensation Board established pursuant to section
157 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2187),
and the Divisions of Military Application and Naval Reactors estab-
lished pursuant to section 25 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2035), are transferred to the Energy Research
and Development Administration and the functions of the Commis-
sion with respect thereto, and with respect to relations with the Mili-
tary Liaison Committee established by section 27 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2037), are transferred to the
Administrator.
(e) There are hereby transferred to and vested in the Administrator
such functions of the Secretary of the Interior, the Department of
the Interior, and officers and components of such department
—
(1) as relate to or are utilized bv the Office of Coal Research
established pursuant to the Act of July 1, 1960 (74 Stat. 336; 30
U.S.C. 661-668);
(2) as relate to or are utilized in connection with fossil fuel
energy research and development programs and related activities
conducted by the Bureau of Mines "energy centers" and syn-
thane plant to provide greater efficiency in the extraction, proc-
essing, and utilization of energy resources for the purpose of
conserving those resources, developing alternative energy
resources, such as oil and gas secondary and tertiary recovery, oil
shale and synthetic fuels, improving methods of managing energy-
related wastes and pollutants, and providing technical guidance
needed to establish and administer national energy policies; and
(3) as relate to or are utilized for underground electric power
transmission research.
The Administrator shall conduct a study of the potential energy
applications of helium and, within six months from the date of the
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enactment of this Act, report to the President and Congress his rec-
ommendations concerning the management of the Federal helium
programs, as they relate to energy.
(f ) There are hereby transferred to and vested in the Administrator
such functions of the National Science Foundation as relate to or are
utilized in connection with
—
(1) solar heating and cooling development; and
(2) geothermal power development.
(g) There are hereby transferred to and vested in the Administrator
such functions of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
officers and components thereof as relate to or are utilized in con-
nection with research, development, and demonstration, but not
assessment or monitoring for regulatory purposes, of alternative
automotive power systems.
(h) To the extent necessary or appropriate to perform functions
and carry out programs transferred by this Act. the Administrator
and Commission may exercise, in relation to the functions so trans-
ferred, any authority or part thereof available by law. including
appropriation Acts, to the official or agency from which such func-
tions were transferred.
(i) In the exercise of his responsibilities under section 10.3, the
Administrator shall utilize, with their consent, to the fullest extent
he determines advisable the technical and management capabilities of
other executive agencies having facilities, personnel, or other resources
which can assist or advantageously be expanded to assist in carrying
out such responsibilities. The Administrator shall consult, with the
head of each agency with respect to such facilities, personnel, or other
resources, and may assign, with their consent, specific programs or
projects in energy research and development as appropriate. In making
such assignments under this subsection, the head of each such agency
shall insure that
—
(1) such assignments shall be in addition to and not detract
from the basic mission responsibilities of the agency, and
(2) such assignments shall be carried out under such guidance

















Sec. 105. (a) The Administrator is authorized to prescribe such
policies, standards, criteria, procedures, rules, and regulations as he
may deem to be necessary or appropriate to perform functions now or
hereafter vested in him.
(b) The Administrator shall engage in such policy planning, and
perform such program evaluation analyses and other studies, as may
be necessary to promote the efficient and coordinated administration
of the Administration and properly assess progress toward the achieve-
ment of its missions.
(c) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the Adminis-
trator may delegate any of his functions to such officers and employees
of the Administration as lie may designate, and may authorize such
successive redclegations of sucli functions as he may deem to be neces-
sary or appropriate.
(d) Except as provided in section 102 and in section 104(d). the
Administrator may organize the Administration as he may deem to
be necessary or appropriate.
(e) The Administrator is authorized to establish, maintain, alter, or
discontinue such State, regional, district, local, or other field offices as
he may deem to be necessary or appropriate to perform functions now




















(f) The Administrator shall cause a seal of office to be made for
the Administration of such device as he shall approve, and judicial
notice shall be taken of such seal.
(g) The Administrator is authorized to establish a working capital
fund, to be available without fiscal year limitation, for expenses neces-
sary for the maintenance and operation of such common administrative
services as he shall find to be desirable in the interests of economy and
efficiency. There shall be transferred to the fund the stocks of supplies,
equipment, assets other than real property, liabilities, and unpaid
obligations relating to the services which he determines will be per-
formed through the fund. Appropriations to the fund, in such amounts
as may be necessary to provide additional working capital, are author-
ized. The working capital fund shall recover, from the appropriations
and funds for which services are performed, either in advance or by
way of reimbursement, amounts which will approximate the costs
incurred, including the accrual of annual leave and the depreciation
of equipment. The fund shall also be credited with receipts from the
sale or exchange of its property, and receipts in payment for loss or
damage to property owned by the fund.
(h) Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive
branch of the Government is authorized to furnish to the Adminis-
trator, upon his request, any information or other data which the












Sec. 106. (a) The Administrator is authorized to select, appoint,
employ, and fix the compensation of such officers and employees,
including attorneys, pursuant to section 161 d. of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(d) ) as are necessary to per-
form the functions now or hereafter vested in him and to prescribe
their functions.
(b) The Administrator is authorized to obtain services as provided
by section 3109 of title 5 of the United States Code.
(c) The Administrator is authorized to provide for participation
of military personnel in the performance of his functions. Members
of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, or the Marine Corps may be
detailed for service in the Administration by the appropriate military
Secretary, pursuant to cooperative agreements with the Secretary,
for service in the Administration in positions other than a position
the occupant of which must be approved by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
(d) Appointment, detail, or assignment to, acceptance of, and service
in, any appointive or other position in the Administration under this
section shall in no way affect the status, office, rank, or grade which
such officers or enlisted men may occupy or hold, or any emolument,
perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of
any such status, office, rank, or grade. A member so appointed, detailed,
or assigned shall not be subject to direction or control by Ms Armed
Force, or any officer thereof, directly or indirectly, with respect to
the responsibilities exercised in the position to which appointed,
detailed, or assigned.
(e) The Administrator is authorized to pay transportation expenses,
and per diem in lieu of subsistence expenses, in accordance with
chapter 57 of title 5 of the United States Code for travel between
places of recruitment and duty, and while at places of duty, of persons
appointed for emergency, temporary, or seasonal services in the field
service of the Administration.
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(f) The Administrator is authorized to utilize, on a reimbursable
basis, the services of any personnel made available by any department,
agency, or instrumentality, including any independent agency of the
Government.
(g) The Administrator is authorized to establish advisory boards,
in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (Public Law 92-403), to advise with and make recommendations
to the Administrator on legislation, policies, administration, research,
and other matters.
(h) The Administrator is authorized to employ persons who are not
citizens of the United States in expert, scientific, technical, or pro-





5 USC app. i.
Moncitizens.
POWERS
Sec. 107. (a) The Administrator is authorized to exercise his powers
ill such manner as to insure the continued conduct of research and
development and related activities in areas or fields deemed by the
Administrator to be pertinent to the acquisition of an expanded fund
of scientific, technical, and practical knowledge in energy matters. To
this end, the Administrator is authorized to make arrangements
(including contracts, agreements, and loans ^ for the conduct of
research and development activities with private or public institutions
or persons, including participation in joint or cooperative projects
of a research, developmental, or experimental nature; to make pay-
ments (in lump sum or installments, and in advance or by way of reim-
bursement, with necessary adjustments on account of overpayments
or underpayments) ; and generally to take such steps as he may deem
necessary or appropriate to perform functions now or hereafter vested
in him. Such functions of the Administrator under this Act as are
applicable to the nuclear activities transferred pursuant to this title
shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended, and to other authority applicable to such nuclear activi-
ties. The nonnuclear responsibilities and fimctions of the Adminis-
trator referred to in sections 103 and 104 of this Act shall be carried
out pursuant to the provisions of this Act, applicable authority exist-
ing immediately before the effective date of this Act, or in accordance
with the provisions of chapter 4 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (42 U-S.C. 2051-2053).
(b) Except for public buildings as defined in the Public Buildings
Ace of 1950, ab amended, and with respect to leased space subject to
the provisions of Reorganization Plan Numbered 18 of 1950, the
Administrator is authorized to acquire (by purchase, lease, condemna-
tion, or otherwise), construct, improve, repair, operate, and maintain
facilities and real property as the Administrator deems to be neces-
sary in and outside of the District of Columbia. Such authority shall
apply only to facilities required for the maintenance and operation
of laboratories, research and testing sites and facilities, quarters, and
related accommodations for employees and dependents of employees
of the Administration, and such other special-purpose real property
as the Administrator deems to be necessary in and outside the District
of Columbia. Title to any property or interest therein, real, personal,
or mixed, acquired pursuant to this section, shall be in the United
States.
(c)(1) The Administrator is authorized to provide, construct, or
maintain, as necessary and when not otherwise available, the follow-
ing for employees and their dependents stationed at remote locations:
(A) Emergency medical services and supplies.
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(D) Audiovisual equipment, accessories, and supplies for
recreation and training.
(E) Reimbursement for food, clothing, medicine, and other
supplies furnished by such employees in emergencies for the
temporary relief of distressed persons.
( F) Living and working quarters and facilities.
(G) Transportation for school-age dependents of employees
to the nearest appropriate educational facilities.
(2) The furnishing of medical treatment under subparagraph (X)
of paragraph (1) and the furnishing of services and supplies under
paragraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1) shall be at prices reflecting
reasonable value as determined by the Administrator.
(3) Proceeds from reimbursements under this section shall be
deposited in the Treasury and may be. withdrawn by the Adminis-
trator to pay directly the cost of such work or services, to repay or
make advances to appropriations or funds which do or will bear all
or a part of such cost, or to refund excess sums when necessary; except
that such payments may be credited to a service or working capital
fund otherwise established by law. and used under the law governing
such funds, if the fund is available for use by the Administrator for
performing the work or services for which payment is received.
(d) The Administrator is authorized to acquire any of the follow-
ing described rights if the property acquired thereby is for use in, or
is useful to, the performance of functions vested in him
:
(1) Copyrights, patents, and applications for patents, designs.
processes, specifications, and data.
(2) Licenses under copyrights, patents, and applications for
patents.
(3) Releases, before suit is brought, for past infringement of
patents or copyrights.
(e) Subject to the provisions of chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2161-2166). and other applicable
law, the Administrator shall disseminate scientific, technical, and
practical information acquired pursuant to this title through infor-
mation programs and other appropriate means, and shall encourage
the dissemination of scientific, technical, and practical information
relating to energy so as to enlarge the fund of such information and
to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticism which is
essential to scientific and industrial progress and public understanding.
(f) The Administrator is authorized to accept, hold, administer,
and utilize gifts, and bequests of property, both real and personal, for
the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the Administration.
Gifts and bequests of money and proceeds from sales of other prop-
erty received as gifts or bequests shall be deposited in the Treasury
and shall be disbursed upon the order of the Administrator. For the
purposes of Federal income, estate, and gift taxes, property accepted
under this section shall be considered as a gift or bequest to the
United States.
INTERIM COORDINATION"
Skc. 108. (a) There is established in the Executive Office of the
President an Energy Resources Council. The Council shall be com-
posed of the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of the
Federal Energy Administration, the Administrator of rhe Energy
Research and Development Administration, the Secretary of State,
the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and such other
officials of the Federal Government as the President may designate.
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(b) It shall be the duty and function of the Council to
—
(1) insure communication and coordination among the agencies
of the Federal Government which have responsibilities for the
development and implementation of energy policy or for the
management of energy resources;
(2) make recommendations to the President and to the Con-
gress for measures to improve the implementation of Federal
energy policies or the management of energy resources with
particular emphasis upon policies and activities involving two
or more Departments or independent agencies ; and
(3) advise the President in the preparation of the reorganiza-
tion recommendations required by section 110 of this Act.
(c) The Chairman of the Council may not refuse to testify before
the Congress or any duly authorized committee thereof regarding
the duties of the Council or other matters concerning interagency
coordination of energy policy and activities.
(d) This section shall be effective no later than sixty days after
the enactment of this Act or such earlier date as the President shall
prescribe and publish in the Federal Register, and shall terminate
upon enactment of a permanent department responsible for energy
and natural resources or two years after such effective date, which-







Sec. 109. (a) The President shall transmit to the Congress as Report to
promptly as possible, but not later than June 30, 1!)75, such additional Congress.
recommendations as he deems advisable for organization of energy 42 usc 5819,
and related functions in the Federal Government, including, but not
limited to, whether or not there shall be established (1) a Department
of Energy and Natural Resources, (2) an Energy Policy Council,
and (3) a consolidation in whole or in part of regulatory functions
concerning energy.
(b) This report shall replace and serve the purposes of the report
required by section 15(a)(4) of the Federal Energy Administration Ante, p. 109.
Act.
COORDINATION WITH ENVIRONMENTAL EFFORTS
Sec. 110. The Administrator is authorized to establish programs 42 use 5820.
to utilize research and development performed by other Federal
agencies to minimize the adverse environmental effects of energy
projects. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
as well as other affected agencies and departments, shall cooperate
fully with the Administrator in establishing and maintaining such
programs, and in establishing appropriate interagency agreements to
develop cooperative programs and to avoid unnecessary duplication.
TITLE II—NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ESTABLISHMENT AND TRANSFERS
Sec. 201. (a) There is established an independent regulatory com- Members and
mission to be known as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which Chairman,
shall be composed of five members, each of whom shall be a citizen 42 usc 5841 »















of the Commission as Chairman thereof to serve as such during the
pleasure of the President. The Chairman may from time to Him-
designate any other member of the Commission as Acting Chairman
to act in the place and stead of the Chairman during his absence.
The Chairman (or the Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chair-
man) shall preside at all meetings of the Commission and a quorum
for the transaction of business shall consist of at least three members
present. Each member of the Commission, including the Chairman,
shall have equal responsibility and authority in all decisions ami
actions of the Commission, shall have full access to all information
relating to the performance of his duties or responsibilities, and shall
have one vote. Action of the Commission shall be determined by a
majority vote of the members present. The Chairman ( or Acting ( hai r-
man in the absence of the Chairman) shall l>e the official spokesman of
the Commission in its relations with the Congress, Government
agencies, persons, or the public, and. on behalf of the Commission,
shall see to the faithful execution of the policies and decisions of the
Commission, and shall report thereon to the Commission from rime
to time or as the Commission may direct. The Commission shall have
an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
(b) (1) Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) Appointments of members pursuant to this subsection shall
be made in such a manner that not more than three members of the
Commission shall be members of the same political party.
(c) Each member shall serve for a term of five, years, each such
term to commence on July 1, except that of the five members first
appointed to the Commission, one shall serve for one year, one for
'two years, one for three years, one for four years, and one for five years,
to be designated by the President at the time of appointment.
(d) Such initial appointments shall be submitted to the Senate
within sixty days of the signing of this Act. Any individual who is
serving as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission at the time
of the enactment of this Act, and who may be appointed by the
President to the Commission, shall be appointed for a term designated
by the President, but which term shall terminate not later than the
end of his present term as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission.
without regard to the requirements of subsection (b) (2) of this
section. Any subsequent appointment of such individuals shall be sub-
ject to the provisions of this section.
(e) Any member of the Commission may be removed by the Presi-
dent for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Xo
member of the Commission shall engage in any business, vocation, or
employment other than that of serving as a member of the Commission.
(f) There are hereby transferred to the Commission all the licensing
and related regulatory functions of the Atomic. Energy Commission.
the Chairman and members of the Commission, the General Counsel,
and other officers and components of the Commission—which func-
tions officers, components, and personnel are excepted from the transfer
to the Administrator by section 104(c) of this Act.
(g) In addition to other functions and personnel transferred to the
Commission, there are also transferred to the Commission
—
(1) the functions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board:
(2) such personnel as the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget determines are necessary for exercising responsibili-
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ties under section 205, relating to, research, for the purpose of
confirmatory assessment relating to licensing and other regula-
tion under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 42 usc 2011
amended, and of this Act. note,
LICENSING AND RELATED REGULATORY FUNCTIONS RESPECTING SELECTED
ADMINISTRATION FACILITIES
Sec. 202. Notwithstanding the exclusions provided for in section 42 usc 5842.
110 a. or any other provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2140(a)), the Xuclear Regulatory Commission
shall, except as otherwise specifically provided bv section 110 b. of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42T.S.C. 2140(b)), or
other law, have licensing and related regulatory authority pursuant
to chapters 6, 7, 8, and" 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 42 USC 2071-
amended, as to the following facilities of the Administration
:
2112, 2131-
(1) Demonstration Liquid Metal Fast Breeder reactors when 2140 «
operated as part of the power generation facilities of an electric
utility system, or when operated in any other manner for the pur-
pose of demonstrating the suitability for commercial applica-
tion of such a reactor.
(2) Other demonstration nuclear reactors—except those in
existence on the elective date of this Act—when operated as part
of the power generation facilities of an electric utility system, or
when operated in any other manner for the purpose of demon-
strating the suitability for commercial application of such a
reactor.
(3) Facilities used primarily for the receipt and storage of
high-level radioactive wastes resulting from activities licensed
under such Act.
(4) Retrievable Surface Storage Facilities and other facilities
authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term
storage of high-level radioactive waste generated by the Admin-
istration, which are not used for, or are part of, research and
development activities.
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
Skc. 203. (a) There is hereby established in the Commission an Establishment.
Office of Xuclear Reactor Regulation under the direction of a Director 42 usc 5843.
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, who shall be appointed by the Com- strector.
mission, who may report directly to the Commission, as provided in
section 209, and who shall serve at the pleasure of and be removable
by the Commission.
(b) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Director of Xuclear Functions.
Reactor Regulation shall perform such functions as the Commission
shall delegate including:
(1) Principal licensing and regulation involving all facilities,
and materials licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 42 use 2011
amended, associated with the construction and operation of note.
nuclear reactors licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended;
(2) Review the safety and safeguards of all such facilities,
materials, and activities, and such review functions shall include,
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(A) monitoring, testing and recommending upgrading
of systems designed to prevent substantial health or safetv
hazards; and
(B) evaluating methods of transporting special nuclear
and other nuclear materials and of transporting and storing
high-level radioactive wastes to prevent radiation hazards
to employees and the general public.
(3) Recommend research necessary for the discharge of the
functions of the Commission.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any way
the functions of the Administration relating to the safe operation of
all facilities resulting from all activities within the jurisdiction o£










OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
Sec. 204. (a) There is hereby established in the Commission an
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards under the direction
of a Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, who shall
be appointed by the Commission, who may report directly to the Com-
mission as provided in section 2(>9, and who shall serve at the pleasure
of and be removable by the Commission.
(b) Subject to the provisions of this Act. the Director of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards shall perform such functions as the
Commission shall delegate including:
(T) Principal licensing and regulation involving all facilities
andrnaterials, licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as
amended, associated with the processing, transport, and handling
of nuclear materials, including the provision and maintenance
of safeguards against threats, thefts, and sabotage of such
licensed facilities, and materials.
(2) Review safety and safeguards of all such facilities and
materials licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, and such review shall include, but not be limited to
—
(^ monitoring, testing, and recommending upgrading of
internal accounting systems for special nuclear and other
nuclear materials licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended
;
(B) developing, in consultation and coordination with the
Administration, contingency plans for dealing wiih rl treat s.
thefts, and sabotage relating i.o snfciai nucjeaF ni-r.ori-iis,
nigli-level radioactive wastes and nuclear iac;hnes_n^uirn!g^
jToin all acti vities licensed under the Atomic Energy A<c o_c
"I'J&4, as amended!
(UJ assessing the need for, and the feasibility of. estab-
l lishing a security agency within the office for the performance
J of the safeguards functions, and a report with recommenda-\ tions on this matter shall be prepared within one year of
\ the effective date of this Act and promptly transmitted to
» the Congress by the Commission.
(3) Recommending research to enable the Commission to
more effectively perform its functions.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any
way the functions of the Administration relating to the safeguarding
of special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear
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facilities resulting from all activities within the jurisdiction of the
Administration pursuant to this Act.
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH
Cooperation of
Federal agendas.
Sec. 205. (a) There is hereby established in the Commission an 4pta cii lfi4cnt '
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research under the direction of a Director
of Nuclear Regulatory Research, who shall be appointed by the Com- Direotor «
mission, who may report directly to the Commission as provided in
section 209, and who shall serve at the pleasure of and be removable
by the Commission.
(b) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Director of Nuclear Functions.
Regulatory Research shall perform such functions as the Commission
shall delegate including:
(1) Developing recommendations for research deemed neces-
sary for performance by the Commission of its licensing and
related regulatory functions.
(2) Engaging in or contracting for research which the Com-
mission deems necessary for the performance of its licensing and
related regulatory functions.
(c) The Administrator of the Administration and the head of
every other Federal agency shall
—
(1) cooperate with respect to the establishment of priorities
for the furnishing of such research services as requested by the
Commission for the conduct of its functions
;
(2) furnish to the Commission, on a reimbursable basis,
through their own facilities or by contract or other arrangement,
such research services as the Commission deems necessary and
requests for the performance of its functions: and
(')) consult and cooperate with the Commission on research
and development matters of mutual interest and provide such
information and physical access to its facilities as will assist
the Commission in acquiring the expertise necessary to perform its
licensing and related regulatory functions.
(d) Nothing in subsections (a) and (b) of this section or section
201 of this Act shall be construed to limit in any way the functions
of the Administration relating to the safety of activities within the
jurisdiction of the Administration.
(e) Each Federal agency, subject to the provisions of existing law,
shall cooperate with the Commission and provide such information
and research services, on a reimbursable basis, as it may have or be





Sec 206. (a) Any individual director, or responsible officer of a 42 usc 5846.
firm constructing, owning, operating, or supplying the components
of any facility or activity which is licensed or otherwise regulated
pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, or pursuant to 42 usc 2011
this Act, who obtains information reasonably indicating that such note,
facility or activity or basic components supplied to such facility or
activity
—
(1) fails to comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, or any applicable rule, regulation, order, or license of
the Commission relating to substantial safety hazards, or
(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial safety














shall immediately notify the Commission of such failure to comply,
or of such defect, unless such person has actual knowledge that the
Commission has been adequately informed of such defect or failure
to comply.
(b) Any person who knowingly and consciously fails to provide
the notice required by subsection (a) of this section shall be subject
to a civil penalty in an amount equal to the amount provided bv
section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended.
(c) The requirements of this section shall be prominently posted
on the premises of any facility licensed or otherwise regulated
pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
(d) The Commission is authorized to conduct such reasonable
inspections and other enforcement activities as needed to insure













NUCLEAR ENERGT CENTER SITE SURVEY
Sec. 207. (a) (1) The Commission is authorized and directed to
make or cause to be made under its direction, a national survey, which
shall include consideration of each of the existing or future electric
reliability regions, or other appropriate regional areas, to locare and
identif}' possible nuclear energy center sites. This survey shall be
conducted in cooperation with other interested Federal, State, and
local agencies, and the views of interested persons, including electric
utilities, citizens' groups, and others, shall be solicited and considered.
(2) For purposes of this section, the term "nuclear energy center
site" means any site, including a site not restricted to land, large
enough to support utility operations or other elements of the total
nuclear fuel cycle, or both including, if appropriate, nuclear fuel
reprocessing facilities, nuclear fuel fabrication plants, retrievable
nuclear waste storage facilities, and unranium enrichment facilities.
(3) The survev shall include
—
(a) a regional evaluation of natural resources, including land.
air, and water resources, available for use in connection with
nuclear energy center sites; estimates of future electric power
requirements that can be served bv each nuclear energy center
site; an assessment of the. economic impact of each nuclear energy
site; and consideration of any other relevant factors, including
but not limited to population distribution, proximity to electric
load centers and to other elements of the fuel cycle, transmission
line rights-of-way, and the availability of other fuel resources:
(b) an evaluation of the environmental impact likely to result
from construction and operation of such nuclear energy centers.
including an evaluation whether such nuclear energy centers will
result in creator or lesser <mvironmcntal impact than separate
siting of the reactors and/or fuel cycle facilities; and
(c) consideration of the use of federally owned property and
other properly designated for public use. but excluding national
parks, national forests, national wilderness areas, and national his-
toric monuments.
ss (4) A report of the results of the survey shall be published and
transmitted to the Congress and the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity not later than one year from the date of the enactment of this
Act and shall be made available to the public, and shall be updated
from time to time thereafter as the Commission, in its discretion,
deems advisable. The report shall include the Commission's evaluation
of the results of the survey and any conclusions and recommendations,
including recommendations for legislation, which the Commission
may have concerning the feasibility and practicality of locating
nuclear power reactors and/or other elements of the nuclear fuel cycle
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on nuclear energy center sites. The Commission is authorized to adopt
policies which will encourage the location of nuclear power reactors
and related fuel cycle facilities on nuclear energy center sites insofar
as practicable.
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE RETORTS
Sec. 208. The Commission shall submit to the Congress each quarter
a report listing for that period any abnormal occurrences at or asso-
ciated with any facility which is licenced or otherwise regulated pur-
suant to the Atomic Energy Act of 195+ as amended, or pursuant to
this Act. For the purposes of this section an abnormal occurrence is an
unscheduled incident or event which the Commission determines is
significant from the. standpoint of public health or safety. Nothing in
the preceding sentence shall limit the authority of a court to review
the determination of the Commission. Each such report shall
contain
—
(1) the date and place of each occurrence
;
(2) the nature and probable consequence of each occurrence
;
(3) the cause or causes of each ; and
(4) any action taken to prevent reoccurrence ;
.
the Commission shall also provide as wide dissemination to the public
of the information specified in clauses (1) and (2) of this section as
reasonably possible within lifteen days of its receiving information of
each abnormal occurrence and shall provide as wide dissemination to
the public as reasonably possible of the information specified in clauses











Sec. "209. (a) The Commission shall appoint an Executive Director Executive
for Operations, who shall serve at the pleasure of and be removable Director.
by the Commission. 42 use 5849.
(b) The Executive Director shall perform such functions as the Functions.
Commission may direct, except that the Executive Director shall not
limit the authority of the director of any component organization pro-
vided in this Act to communicate with or report directly to the Com-
mission when such director of a component organization deems it
necessary to carry out his responsibilities.
(c) There shall be in the Commission not more than live additional other officers,
officers appointed by the Commission. The positions of such officers
shall be considered career positions and be subject to subsection 161 d. 42 usc 2201.
of the Atomic Energy Act.
TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS AND TRANSITIONAL
PROVISIONS
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, whenever Lapses of agen-
all of the functions or programs of an agency, or other body, or any oies and posi-
component thereof, affected by this Act, have been transferred from tions.
that agency, or other body, or any component thereof by this Act, the 42 usc 5871.
agency, or other body, or component thereof shall lapse. If an agency,
or other body, or any component thereof, lapses pursuant to the pre-
ceding sentence, each position and office therein which was expressly
authorized by law, or the incumbent of which was authorized to
receive compensation at the rate prescribed for an office or position
at level II, III, IV, or V of the Executive Schedule (5 U.S.C.
5313-5316) , shall lapse.
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Savings clauses. (b) All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, con-
tracts, certificates, licenses, and privileges
—
(1) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to
become effective by the President, any Federal department or
agency or official thereof, or by a court of competent jurisdiction.
in the performance of functions which are transferred under
this Act, and
(2) which are in effect at the time this Act takes effect,
shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, ter-
minated, superseded, set aside, or revoked by the President, the
Administrator, the Commission, or other authorized officials, a court
of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law.
(c) The provisions of this Act shall not affect any proceeding
pending, at the time this section takes effect, before the Atomic Energy
Commission or any department or agency (or component thereof)
functions of which are transferred by this Act ; but such proceedings,
to the extent that they relate to functions so transferred, shall be
continued. Orders shall be issued in such proceedings, appeals shall
be taken therefrom, and payments shall be made pursuant to such
orders, as if this Act had not been enacted; and orders issued in any
such proceedings shall continue in effect until modified, terminated,
superseded, or revoked by a duly authorized official, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. Nothing in this sub-
section shall be deemed to prohibit the discontinuance or modification
of any such proceeding under the same terms and conditions and to
the same extent that such proceeding could have been discontinued if
this Act had not been enacted.
(d) Except as provided in subsection (f)—
(1) the provisions of this Act shall not affect suits commenced
prior to the date this Act takes effect, and
(2) in all such suits proceedings shall be had, appeals taken.
and judgments rendered, in the same manner and effect as if
this Act had not been enacted.
(e) No suit, action, or other proceeding commenced by or against
any officer in his official capacity as an officer of any department or
agency, functions of which are transferred by this Act, shall abate
by reason of the enactment of this Act. No cause of action by or
against any department or agency, functions of which are transferred
by this Act. or by or against any officer thereof in his official capacity
shall abate by reason of the enactment of this Act. Causes of actions,
suits, actions, or other proceedings may be asserted by or against the
United States or such official as may be appropriate and, in any
litigation pending when this section takes effect, the court may at
any time, on its own motion or that of any party, enter any order
which will give effect to the provisions of this section.
(f) If, before the date on which this Act takes effect, any depart-
ment or agency, or officer thereof in his official capacity, is a party
to a suit, and under this Act any function of such department, agency.
or officer is transferred to the Administrator or Commission, or any
other official, then such suit shall be continued as if this Act had not
been enacted, with the Administrator or Commission, or other official,
as the case may be. substituted.
(g) Final orders and actions of any official or component in the
performance of functions transferred by this Act shall be subject
to judicial review to the same extent and in the same manner as if
such orders or actions had been made or taken by the officer, depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality in the performance of such functions
immediately preceding the effective date of this Act. Any statutory
requirements relating to notices, hearings, action upon the record,
or administrative review that apply to any function transferred by
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this Act shall apply to the performance of those functions by the
Administrator or Commission, or any officer or component.
(h) With respect to any function transferred by this Act and
performed after the effective date of this Act, reference in any other
law to any department or agency, or any oHicer or office, the functions
of which are so transferred, shall be deemed to refer to the Administra-
tion, the Administrator or Commission, or other office or official in
which this Act vests such functions.
(i) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to limit, curtail,
abolish, or terminate any function of the President which he had
immediately before the etfective date of this Act; or to limit, curtail,
abolish, orterminatc his authority to perform such function; or to
limit, curtail, abolish, or terminate his authority to delegate, redelegate,
or terminate any delegation of functions.
(j) Any reference in this Act to any provision of law shall be
deemed :o include, as appropriate, references thereto as now or here-
after amended or supplemented.
(k) Except as may be otherwise expressly provided in this Act,
all functions expressly conferred by this Act shall be in addition to
and not. in substitution for functions existing immediately before the
etfective date of this Act and transferred by this Act.
TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 302. (a) Except as provided in the next sentence, the personnel 42
'
JSC 5872.
employed in connection with, and the personnel positions, assets,
liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of
appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed,
held. used, arising from, available to or to be made available in con-
nection with the functions and programs transferred by this Act, are,
subject to section 202 of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act
of 1050 (31 U.S.C. 581c), correspondingly transferred for appro-
priate allocation. Personnel positions expressly created by law, per-
sonnel occupying those positions on the etfective date of this Act, and
personnel authorized to receive compensation at the rate prescribed
for offices and positions at levels II, III, IV, or V of the Executive
Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5313-5316) on the effective date of this Act shall
be subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section and
section :<01 of this Act.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), transfer of nontemporary
personnel pursuant to this Act shall not cause any such employee to be
separated or reduced in grade or compensation for one year after
such transfer.
(c) Any person who, on the effective date of this Act. held a position
compensated in accordance with the Executive Schedule prescribed
in chapter 53 of title 5 of the United States Code, and who, without
a break in service, is appointed in the Administration to a position
having duties comparable to those performed immediately preceding
his appointment shall continue to be compensated in his new position
at not less than the rate provided for his previous position.
INCIDENTAL DISPOSITIONS
Sec. 303. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is 42 use 5973.
authorized to make such additional incidental dispositions of person-
nel, personnel positions, assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records,
and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, alloca-

























made available in connection with functions transferred by this Act, a3
ho may deem necessary or appropriate to accomplish the intent and
purpose of tliis Act.
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 304. As used in this Act
—
(1) any reference to "function" or "functions" shall be deemed
to include references to duty, obligation, power, authority, re-
sponsibility, right, privilege, and activity, or the plural thereof,
as the case may be ; and
(2) any reference to "perform" or "performance", when used
in relation to functions, shall be deemed to include the exercise of
power, authority, rights, and privileges.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
Sec. 305. (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, appropriations
made under this Act shall be subject to annual authorization.
(b) Authorization of appropriations to the Commission shall re-
flect the need for effective licensing and other regulation of the
nuclear power industry in relation to the growth of such industry.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL AUDIT
Sec. 306. (a) Section 166. "Comptroller General Audit" of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, shall be deemed to be ap-
plicable, respectively, to the nuclear and nonnuclear activities under
title I and to the activities under title II.
(b) The Comptroller General of the United States shall audit,
review, and evaluate the implementation of the provisions of title
II of this Act by the Nuclear Safety and Licensing Commission
not later than sixty months after the effective date of this Act, the
Comptroller General shall prepare and submit to the Congress a
report on his audit, which shall contain, but not be limited to
—
(1) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the licensing and
related regulatory activities of the Commission and the opera-
tions of the Office of Nuclear Safety Research and the Bureau
of Nuclear Materials Security
;
(2) an evaluation of the effect of such Commission activities
on the efficiency, effectiveness, and safety with which the activities
licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, are
carried out
;
(3) recommendations concerning any legislation he deems
necessary, and the reasons therefor, for improving the imple-
mentation of title II.
REPORTS
Sec. 307. (a) The Administrator shall, as soon as practicable after
the end of each fiscal year, make a report to the President for sub-
mission to the Congress on the activities of the Administration dur-
ing the preceding fiscal year. Such report shall include a statement
of the short-range and long-range goals, priorities, and plans of the
Administration together with an assessment of the progress made
toward the attainment of those objectives and toward the more effec-
tive and efficient management of the Administration and the coordi-
nation of its functions.
(b) During the first year of operation of the Administration, the
Administrator, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, shall
conduct a thorough review of the desirability and feasibility of trans-
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ferring to the Department of Defense or other Federal agencies the
functions of the Administrator respecting military application and
restricted data, and within one year after the Administrator first
takes oilice the Administrator shall make, a report to the President,
for submission to the Congress, setting forth his comprehensive analy-
sis, the principal alternatives, and the specific recommendations of
the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense.
(c) The Commission shall, as soon as practicable after the end of
each fiscal year, make a report to the President for submission to
the Congress on the activities of the Commission during the preced-
ing fiscal year. Such report shall include a clear statement of the
short-range and long-range goals, priorities, and plans of the Com-
mission as they relate to the benelits, costs, and risks of commercial
nuclear power. Such report shall also include a clear description of
the Commission's activities and findings in the following areas
—
(1) insuring the safe design of nuclear powerplants and other
licensed facilities;
(2) investigating abnormal occurrences and defects in nuclear
powerplants and other licensed facilities
;
(:>) safeguarding special nuclear materials at all stages of the
nuclear fuel cycle;
(4) investigating suspected, attempted, or actual thefts of spe-
cial nuclear materials in the licensed sector and developing con-
tingency plans for dealing with such incidents;
(5) insuring the safe, permanent disposal of high-level radio-
active wastes through the licensing of nuclear activities and
facilities;
(6) protecting the public against the hazards of low-level
radioactive emissions from licensed nuclear activities and
facilities.
INFORMATION TO COMMITTEES
Sec. 308. The Administrator shall keep the appropriate congres-







Sec. 309. The Administrator, when authorized in an appropriation
Act, may, in any fiscal year, transfer funds from one appropriation
to another within the Administration; except, that no appropria-
tion shall be either increased or decreased pursuant to this section by
more than 5 per centum of the appropriation for such fiscal year.
42 USC 5879,
CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO CERTAIN OTHER LAWS
Sec. 310. Subchapter II (relating to Executive Schedule pay rates)
of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended as follows:
(1) Section 5313 is amended by striking out "(8) Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission. 1 ' and inserting in lieu thereof "(8)
Chairman. Xuclear Regulatory Commission.", and by adding at
the end thereof the following
:
"(22) Administrator of Energy Research and Development
Administration.".
(2) Section 5314 is amended by striking out "(42) Members,
Atomic Energy Commission." and inserting in lieu thereof "(42)
Members. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.", and by adding at
the end thereof the following:
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(3) Section 5315 is amended by striking out paragraph (50),
and by addingat the end thereof the following
:
"(100) Assistant Administrators, Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration (6).
"(101) Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
"(102) "Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
"(103) Director of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
"(104) Executive Director for Operations, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission."
(4) Section 5316 is amended by striking out paragraphs (29*1.
(62), (69), and (102), by striking out "(81) General Counsel of
the Atomic Energy Commission," and inserting in lieu thereof
"(81) General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."*.
and by adding at the end thereof the following:
"(134) General Counsel, Energy Research and Development
Administration.
"(135) Additional officers, Energy Research and Development
Administration (8).
"(136) Additional officers, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(5).".
SEPARABILITY
42 use 5801 Sec. 311. If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof
note. to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this
Act, and the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE AND INTERIM APPOINTMENTS
42 use 5801 Sec. 312. (a) This Act shall take effect one hundred and twenty
note. days after the date of its enactment, or on such earlier date as the
Publloation in President may prescribe and publish in the Federal Register; except
d!1?^^ tna *" any °^ tne °^cers provided for in title I of this Act may be
nominated and appointed, as provided by this Act, at any time after
the date of enactment of this Act. Funds available to any department.
or agency (or any official or component thereof), anv functions of
which are transferred to the Administrator and the Commission by
this Act, may, with the approval of the President, be used to pay the
compensation and expenses of any officer appointed pursuant to this
subsection until such time as funds for that purpose are otherwise
available.
(b) In the event that any officer required by this Act to be appointed
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall not have entered
upon office on the effective date of this Act. the President may designate
any officer, whose appointment was required to be made by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate and who was such an officer
immediately prior to the effective date of this Act. to act in such
office until the office is filled as provided in this Act. "While so act-
ing, such persons shall receive compensation at the rates provided by








Sec. 401. No person shall on the ground of sex be excluded from 42 use 5891.
participation in, be denied a license under, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity carried
on or receiving Federal assistance under any title of this Act. This
provision will be enforced through agency provisions and rides similar
to those already established, with respect to racial and ether dis-
crimination, under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1064. However, 42 use 2000d.
this remedy is not exclusive and will not prejudice or cut oiE any other
legal remedies available to a discriminates.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
RULES and REGULATIONS
TTTU 10. CHAPTER 1. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS- ENERGY
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
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.71JO Violations.
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2201) Interpret of apply Ha S3. 183. 68 Stat.
930.954 (41 U.S-C 2073. 2233); »*c». 202. 206.
Pub. L 93-438. 88 Stat. 1244. 1246 (42 U.S.C
$842. 5K46)
QAnauL Ptonsums
I S 73.1 Purpose) and scop*.
I (*> Purpose. This port prescribe* re-
'qulrements (or physical protection of
5 special nuclear material at fixed sites
gand in transit and of plants la which
s special nuclear material Is used, for the
u. purpose of protection against acts of ln-
Idustriai sabotage and protection of spe-
cial nuclear material against theft by
establishment and maintenance of a
physical protection system of: (1) Pro-
tective barriers and Intrusion detection
derlcea at fixed sites to provide early
detection of an attack. (2) deterrence to
attack by means of armed guards and
escorts, and <3> liaison and communica-
tion a/tth law enforcement authorities
capable of rendering assistance ti
counter such attacks.
(b) Seove. <1> This part prescribes
requirements for (1) the physical pro-
tection of production and utilization fa-
cilities licensed pursuant to Part 50 of
this chapter: (11) the physical protection
of plant* Ln which activities licensed
pursuant to Part 70 or th'.* chap;er are
conducted, and the physical protection
of special nuclear material, by an? per-
son who pursuant to the rcfiiiutj in
Part 70 cf this chapter p^fcsesses or u*-s
at any site or contiyuoiis sites .'object
lo ccntrvl by the licensee, ur.mvjm-2.55
(contained in uranium enriched w 20
I.erccnt or more In the rT- 235 isotope;.
urarJum-233, or Plutonium alcne or in
-:.v combination In a quantity of £.00
grams or more computed by the formula,
Eramt r ( grams contained tj-235) * 2-5 t^raim
L-2JJ + osrni* plutonium).
!2) This part prescribes requlremenU
for the physical protection of special nu-
clear material in transportation by any
person who U licensed pursuant to the
regulations In Part 10 of this chapter
who imports, exports, transports, deliv-
ers to a earner for transport ln a single
shipment, or takes delivery of a single
shipment free oq board at the point
where it 1j delivered to ?. carrier, either
uranium-235 (contained in urarjum en-
riched to 20 percent or Tiore in ;he U-235
isotope), uranl'im-233. or plutonium. or
any combination of these materiais.
which Is 5.000 erams or more computed
>y the formula, grams^f^rr-.ras con-
tained U-235)
-T-2.S (grams U-233 + grams
Plutonium).
(3) This ^>art also applies to shipments
by air of s-pecial nuclenr materia] in
Quantities exceeding (!) 20 -grams or 20
curies, whichever Is less, ol plutonium
or uranium-233, or (il) 350 grams of
uranium- 23 5 (contained In uranium en-
riched to 20 percent or more in the CJ-23S
lsotopei
.
(<) Special nuclear material subject
to tills part may also he protected dut-
suant to security procedures prescribed
by the Commission or another Govern-
ment agency for the protection of classi-
ended 39 FR 2352.
fled materials. The provisions and re-
quirements of thu part are in addition
to. and not ln substitution for. any such
security procedures. Compliance with the-
requirements of this part does not re-
lieve any licensee frcm any recuirement
or obligation to protect special nuclei
material pursuant to security procedures
prescribed by the Coinmission or other
Government agency lor the protection
of classified materials.
§ 73.2 Definitions.
As used in this part:
(a) Terms denned in Parts 50 and "0
of this chapter hme the sime meaning
when used In this part.
( b) "Au thorlzed Individual" Lr.eans
any individual, including an employe*, a
consultant, or an agent of a licensee, wno
has been des.gr.ated in writing by a li-
censee to have responsibility for surveol*
'ince of special nuclear materai.
(c) "Guard" means a uniformed indi-
vidual armed with a firearm whese pri-
mary duty is the protection of special
nuclear material against theft anc or
;; the protection oi a plant against lncus-
-i tilal sabotage.
s (d> "Watchman" means an Individual.
«- not necessarily unformed or armed witj
3 a firearm, who provides protection for a
plant and ilie special nuclear material
therein in the course of performing other
duties.
ie> "Continuous visual surveU!ance',
means unobstructed view at ad times of
a shipment of special nuclear material,
and cf all access to a temporary stjm^o
»rea or cargo compartment containing
thd shipment.
tf) "Physical barrier" means
'1) Fences constructed of No. 1!
American wire gauge, or heavier wire
fabric, topped by three strands or tjore
of barbed wire or similar material en
brackets cngled cutward between JO* and
45* from the .vertical, with en overall
height of not less than et6'nt feet, in-
cluding the barbed topping.
(2)
-Building walls constructed of
stone. bn.-K, cinder biocic, concrete, rteel
or comparable materials lopemags ln
which are «ecured by ira'^s. doors, or
covers of construction ruid fasu.'nlcr of
sufrlc:cnt strength such that the lrte r.niy
of the wall 13 not lessened by any or<tn-
lng), or walls of similar construction,
not port of a building, provided with a
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barbed topping described In paragraph
<f> <1> or this section of a height of not
less than 8 feet.
O) Ceilings and floors constructed to
offer resistance to penetration equivalent o
to '-hat of building vails described in '^deliberate act directed against a plant
paragraph (f)(2) of this section. # in which an activity licensed pursuant to
(g) "Protected area" means an area gthl regulations in this chapter Is con-
entry of a person anvwhere Into the room
and upon exit from the room or upon
movement of an ir dividual within the
room.
(p) "Industrial sabotage" means any
ducted, or to anv comconent of such
3 plant, which could directly or indirectly
endanger the public health and safety by
exposure to radiation, other than such
acts by an enemy of the United States,
whether foreign government or other
person.
encompassed by physical barriers and to
which access is controlled.
' h - "Vital area'* means any Area
which contains vital equipment within
a structure, the walls, roof, and floor of
whlcn constitute physical barriers of con-
struction at least as substantial as wails
as described In paragraph <f) (2> of this
section. -r
Mi "Vital equipment" means any E <q> "ERDA" means the Energy Re-
equipment, system, device, or material. " search and Development Admimstmtion
the failure, destruction, or release of J or its duly authorized representatives.
which could directly or Indirectly endan- o
ger *.he public health and safety by ex-
^_
posure to radiation. Equipment or iys-
tecis which would be required to function \i 73-3 Interpretations,
to protect public health and safety foi- J Except as specifically authorized bylowing such failure, destruction, or re- o the Commission in writing, no Interore-
lease are also considered to be vital.
^ Ullon of the mean | n(r ot tne regulations
<;> "Material access area" means any ln ^^ part bv uv ^cer or employee of
location which contains special nuclear * the commission other than a written in-
material, wjthin a vault or a building. . teroretation by the General Counsel will
| be recognized as binding upo* the Com-
[mission.
the roof, walls, and floor of which each
constitute a physical barrier.
ei "Isolation zone" means any area,
clear of all objects which could conceal
or shield an individual, adjacent to a





ept where otherwise specified, all
detect the presence of Individuals or TO- * communications and reports concerning
nicies within that area £ the regulations in ;his part should be
o i) -intrusion alarm" means a tamper 2 addressed to the Director of Nuclearo
J Indicating electrical, electromechanical. J Material Safety and Safeguards. U.S. Nu--r8 electrooptical. electronic or similar de- o clear Regulatory Commission. Washing- n
" ton. D.C. 20555. or may be delivered ins:
person at the Commi5sion's offices at 1717
vice which will detect Intrusion by an in-
dividual into a building, protected area.
vital area, or material access area, and
alert guards or watchmen by means of
actuated visible and audible signals.
(m> "Lock" in the case of vauits or
vault type rooms means a three- position,
manipulation resistant, dial type, biult-ut
combination lock or combination padlock
and la the case of fences, walls, and
buildings means an integral door lock or
padlock which provides protection equiv-
alent to a six-tumbler cylinder lock.
"Lock" in the case of a vault or vault type
room also means any manipulation re-
sistant, electromechanical device which
provides th* same function as a built-in
«mbtoat:cn !o« or comMn.t.on pad- mmts or ||7,jB through 73.36 and of
to uJ^2L55?J^2PK22 "motcly or S „ „ fl0 „„ „„ of (J,« ^ mtn „.&& Z£^\?£^°[££: | sSLij- * toUowm* «~w -»ue,*»tenzed. and wnich allows operation of £ ™»M;ria*-
the device. "Locked" means protected by « (a) Uranlura-235 contained In ura-
an operable lock. nium enriched to leas than 20 percent in
H Street. NW.. Washington. D C; at 7920 3
Norfolk Avenue. Bethesda. Maryland.
5 71.5 Speri He exemptions.
The Commission may. upon applica-
tion of any interested person or upon Its
own initiative, grant such exemptions
from the requirements of the regulations
in this part as it determines are author-
ized by law and will not endanger life or
property or the common defense and
security, and are otherwise in the public
Interest.
9 73.6 Exemptions for certain truant iti"«
and Winds of «D«ioi nuclear rfuierioL
A licensee is exempt from the requlre-
"Vault" means a burg'ar-reslstant
wtndowless enclosure with wails, ijor
and roof of: <1> Steel at least one-half
Inch thick. (2) reinforced concrete or
stone at least S inches thick, <3> non-
rei.n.'oreed concrete or stone at least 12
inches thick, or (4) monolithic floor or
roof construction of equivalent resistance
to entry, with a built-in lock ln a steel
door at least 1 inch thick, exclusive of the
locking mechanism.
*o) "Vault-tvpe room" means a room
with one or more doors, all capable of
being locked, protected by an intrusion
alarm which creates an alarm upon too
the C-235 isotope:
(b) Special nuclear material which is
not readily separable from other radio-
active material and union has a total ex-
ternal radiation close rate in excess of
100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet
from any accessible surface without in-
tervening shjclding; and
<c> Special nuclear material In a
quantity not exceeding 350 grams of ura-
nlum-23S. uranium-233, Plutonium, or a
combination thereof, possessed in any
analytical, research, quality control, met-
allurgical or electronic laboratory.
Physical Psotectiobt or SncuL
Nuclcai Matuial in Transit
3 73.30 General rcquireioenu.
(a) Except as specified In I 73 26(a)
or as otherwise authorized pursuant to
9 73.30(f), each licensee who transports
or who delivers to a carrier for transport
either uraruum-23S (contained Ln ura-
nium enriched to 20 percent or more ln
the U-235 isotope)
, uranium-233. or Plu-
tonium, or any combination of these
materials, which is 5.000 grams or more
computed by the. formula, grams*»
'grams contained U-235) j-2.5 (grams
U-233+ grams Plutonium), shall make
arrangements to assure that such special
nuclear material will, if a common or
contract earner is used, be transported
under the established procedures of a
earner which provides a system for the
physical protection of valuable material
in transit and requires an exchange of
hand-to-hand receipts at origin and
destination and at all points enroute
where there is a transfer of custody.
ib) Transit times of shipment* other
than those specified in 9 73.1 <b)<3> shall
be minimized and routes shall be se-
lected to avoid areas of natural disaster
or civil disorders. Such shipments shall
be preplanned to assure that deliveries
occur at a time when the receiver at the
final delivery point is present to accept
receipt of shipment.
<c) Special nuclear material shall be
shipped in containers which are sealed
by tamper Indicating type seals. The
container shall also be locked If It Is not
in another container or vehicle which Is
locked. If inspection of the container or
velucle is not required by State or local
authorities before flnal destination, the
outermost container or vehicle shall also
be sealed by tamper Indicating type
seals. No container weighing 500 pounds
or less shall be shipped In open trucks,
railroad flat cars or box cars and ships,
TJus paragraph does not apply to ship-
ments of quantities specified ln I 73.1(b)
13).
(d) When guards are used pursuant
to U 73.31<cMl>. 73.31(c)(2), 73.33 and
"3*.35. the licensee shall not permit an
Individual to act as a guard unless there
is documentation that the Individual
has been qualified by demonstrating an
understanding of bis duties and respon-
sibilities. The licensee or bis agent "»»
have documentation that guards has*
been requailned annuallj.
(e> By January 7. 1974. each licensee
shall submit a plan outlining the proce-
dures that will be used to meet the re-
quirements of !5 73.30 through 73.38 and
73.70(g) including a plan for the selec-
tion, qualification, and training of armed
escorts, or the specification and design)
of a specially designed truck or trailer
as appropriate. This plan shall be fol-
lowed by the licensee alter March fty
1974.
'f> A licensee or applicant for a li-
cense may apply to the Commission for.
approval of proposed procedures for
transport of special nuclear material in
a manner not otherwise authorized by
the regulations of this part. Such appli-
cation shall include a description and
quantity of the special nuclear material
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cnrrlo-* to be used. Lie ex;>ecte<1 ttm* In
»-:.n.»i.. Ihe niinibt-r of transfer poiuts.
(li* communications to te used, the ve-
hicle .liual identification, and the rargo
security and surveillance measures to be
used.
«c» Paragraphs (b). (c>. (d). and <f>
of this section are effective March 6,
1974.
§ 73.3 1 Shipment hy road.
<a> All shipments by road shall be
made without ony scheduled intermedi-
ate stops to transfer special nuclear ma-
terial or other carno between the facility
from wnlch It U snlppea and the facility
of the receiver.
<b) All motor vehicles used to trans-
port special nuclear material shall be
equipped with a radiotelephone whlrh
can communicate with a licensee or his
Brent The licensee or rrcnt with whom
communications shall be maintained lor
different segments of the shipment shall
be predestinated before a shipment U
made. Calls to such licensee or agent
shall be made at least every 2 hours
when radiotelephone or conventional
telephone coverage along the route Is
available to relay position and projected
route. Call frequency may extend up to
S hours when radiotelephone or con-
ventional telephone coverage Is not
available along the preplanned route.
at which time a conventional telephone
call shall be made. In the event no call
U received in accordance with these re-
quirements, the licensee or his agent
snail immediately notify an appropriate
law enforcement authority and the ap-
propnatc .Nuclear Regulatory Commission In-
spection ana Enforcement Regional Office
listed m a ivmii v a of this part.
<c> A shipment shall be accompanied
by**? least two people in the vehicle con-
taining the shipment, which may be two
drivers or one driver and an authorized
Individual. The vehicle containing the
shipment shall be under continuous vis-
ual surveillance, or one of the drivers
or authorized Individuals shall be i.n the
cab of the vehicle, awake, and not in a
sleeper berth. The shipment shall be fur-
ther protected by oue of the following
methods:
(1) An armed escort consisting of at
least two guards shall accompany the
shipment tn a separate escort vehicle. Es-
corts shall maintain continuous vigilance
for the presence of conditions or situa-
tions which might threaten the security
of Lie shipment, lake such acuon as cir-
cumstances might require to avoid Inter-
ference with continuous safe passage of
the cargo vehicle, provide assistance to.
or summon aid for crew oi cargo vehxJe*
in case of emergency, check seals and
locks at each stop wnere time permits.
and ooserve the cargo vehicle and adla-
cent areas during stops or layovers. Con-
tinuous radio communication capability
phflll be provided between the cargo ve-
.v. 1. i i trie Oi.cn v?hirl* Escort ve-
hicii "- fad aire t equipped with a radlo-
:<-*?•. here. The !. '-.r-.e may use his own
<-"•,! -. cer as am-*ri escorts or he may





JJTTifTTf-ri, !:~"<**m"Tu:j,cat:Gn ut maLn-
talnt u iluri; c the i ouxsc of the shipment
with the uctnsce or aecnt monitoring the
shipment.
'2) The shipment shall be made In a
specially designed true* or trailer which
reduces the vulnerability to o I version.
Design feature* of tne trujk or trailer
shall permit Immobilization of the van
and provide barriers or deterrents to
physical penetration of the cargo com-
partment unless armed euaris p.re also
used In which case '.nunohruation of
the vehicle is not required.
(d) Transfers to and irom other modes
of transportation ;«iall be in accordance
with f 73 35.
(el Vehicles shall be marked on top
with Identifying letters or numbers
which will permit Identification of Lite
vehicle under daylight conmuons from
the air in clear weather at 1.00C feet
above ground level. The same
-co^le of
letters and numo^rs as those u&sd on
the top shad also be marked on the sides
and rear of the vehicle to permit Uenti-
Qcatlon from the ground.
<t) This section Is effective March 6.
1074.
§ 73.32 Shipment by *ir.
Hi Except as specifically approved by (he
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, no
shipment of special nuclear material
g Shall be made in passenger aircraft in
g excess of <1) 20 grams or 20 curies,
n whichever Is less, of plutonium or uran-
J lum-233. or (2) 350 grams of uranlum-
ffl
225 (contained in urBnlum enriched to
20 percent or more tn the U-235 isotope)
.
<b> In shipments on caxco aircraft of
either uranium-235 (contained In urani-
um enriched to 20 percent or more in
the U-235 Isotope), uranium-233 or plu-
tonium. or any combination of these
materials which Is 5.000 grams or more
computed by the formula, grams --
(grams contained rj-235> + C.5(grams U-
233 4- grams Plutonium), transfers shall
be in accordance with I 73.35. Transfers*
shall be minimized.
(c) Export shipments shall be escort-
ed by an unarmed authorised Individ-
ual, vtio may be a crew member, from
the last terminal In the United States
until the shipment Is unloadc.i at a for-
eign terminal. He shall perform moni-
toring duties at foreign terminal* as de-
scribed la | 73.35.
<d> Paragraph (c> of this section Is
effective March 6. 1874,
§ 73.33 Shipment by rail.
(a) A shipment by rail yhall be escort-
ed by ivo guards, in the shipment car
or an csccrt car of the train, who shall
«eep the shipment cars under observa-
tion and who shall detrain at stops when
practicable ana time permits to guard
the shipment cars under observation,
and check car or container locks and
sfiUs. Radiotelephone communication
shall be maintained with a 1 leer sec or
his agent to relay position every 2 hours
or '.ess. wid at scheduled stops in the
event 'hat radiotelephone coverage was
not available in the last 5 hours before
the stop. The licensee or agent with
whom communications *h*JI be main-
tained for different segments of the ship-
ment sliall be predesisnated before a
shipment Is made. In the event no coll
Is received In accordance with these re-
quirements, the licensee or his agent
shall Immediately notify on appropri-
ate law enforcement authority and the
appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission In-
spection and t-nfofecment Regional Office
listed in Appendix A of this part.
<b) Transfers shall be in accordance
with I 73.35.
(e> This section Is effective March «.
197*.
t
S 73.34 Shipment by ace.
(a) Shipments shall be mode on ves-
sels malting the minimum ports of coll.
Transfers to and from other modes of
transportation shall be In accordance
with i 73.35. There shall be no scheduled
transfers to other ships. At domestic
ports of call whore other cargo Is trans-
ferred, the shipments shall be protected
hi accordance with \ 73-35'a>.
(b> The shipment shall be placed In a
secure compartment which is locked and
scaled. Locks and seals shall be periodi-
cally Inspected In transit, if accessible.
by an escort or crew member.
(c) Export shipments shall be escorted
by an unarmed authorized Individual,
who may be a crew member, from the
last port In the United States until the
shipment is unloaded at a foreign port.
He shall perform monitoring duties at
" foreign ports as described In j 73.35.
j id) Snip-to-shore communications
r> shall he available, and a ship-to-shore
tc contact shall be made every twenty-four
^ hours to relay position Information, and
3 the status of the shipment, which shall
be determined by a dally Inspection
where possible. This- Information shall
be sent, as often as It Is available, to the
licensee or his agent who makes the ar-
rangements for the protection of the
shipment,
<e) This section Is effective March. 4.
1074.
§ 73.35 Transfer of special nuclear
materia L
All transfers shall be monitored 07 »
guard. An alternate guard shall be des-
ignated at ail transfer points to sub-
stitute. If necassary. Monitoring of spe-
cial nuclear material transfers shall be
conducted as follows:
(a) At scheduled Intermediate stops
where special nuclear material is not
scheduled for transfer, the guard shall
observe the opening of the cargo com-
partment and assure that the shipment
is not removed. The guard shall maintain
continuous visual surveillance of the
cargo compartment. Continuous visual
surveillance of the cargo compartment
shall be maintained up to the time the
vehicle is ready to depart. Tht guard
shall observe the vehicle until It has de-
parted, and slia.ll notify the licensee or
his aeent of the latest status immediately
thereafter.
ib) At points where special nuclear
material Is transferred from a vehicle
to storage, from one vehicle to another,
or from storage w a vehicle, the guard
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tlnuous visual surveillance by observing
the opening of the cargo compartment of
the incoming vehicle and assuring Lhat
the shipment is complete by checking
locks and/or seals. Continuous visual
surveillance of a shipment shall be main-
tained at all times it is m the terminal
or in storage. Shipments shall be pre-
planned In order to avoid storage tuned
In excess of 21 hours. Continuous visual
surveillance of the cargo compartment
shall be maintained up to the time the
vehicle Is ready to depart from the ter-
minal. The guard snail observe the veiu-
• is until It has departed, and shall notify
the licensee or his agent of the latest
status immediately thereafter.
<e> The guard shall be required to
Immediately notify the rarner and the
licensee who made tne arrangements for
protection of special nuclear material of
any deviation from or attempted inter-
ference with schedule or routine.
fd> This section is effective March 6.
1074.
§ 7X36 Mwcrllaneou* requirement*.
(a» Each licensee who takes delivery of
special nuclear material free on board
'(•>bJ the point at which it is delivered
lo a carrier for transport shall matcc the
arrangements U> assure thai such special
i(U' - lt-n.r material will oe protected in
transit as prescribed hi *', 7X30 through
13 13, rather tluin the person »ho de-
livers such slilpment to the carrier for
Iran:-port.
<b) Each licensee who lrapoi-U special
5 nuclear material shaJ maxe arrnnge-
t m**nts to assure that such material will
ri Le protected ;n transit as follows:
- (1) An Individual designated by the
2 licensee or his a^ent. or as specified by a
fl contract of cam ace. shall confirm the
container count and examine locks and/
o<r seals for evidcr.re of tampering, at the
flirt place In the United States at which
the
. niptncnl is uncharged from '-lie
arriving carrier.
(2) The shipment shall be protected at
tho first terminal at which it arrives in
the United States and all subsequent
terminals as provided In 1 ] "3 30 through
73.35 and paragraphs (c> and i t > of this
section.
tc) (1> Each licensee who delivers spe-
cial nuclear material to a carrier for
transport shall Immediately notify the
consignee by telephone, telegraph, or
teletype, of the time of Departure of the
shipment, and shall notify or confirm
with the consignee the method of trans-
portation. Including the names of ear-
ners, and the estimated time of arrival
of the shipment at its destination. (2) In
the case of a shipment free on board
if o.b l the point where it Is delivered to
a carrier for transport, each hcensee
shall, before the shipment is delivered to
tho cairlcr. obtain written certification
from the licensee who is to Lake delivery
ol uv» shipment at the i o.b. point that
the physical protection arrangements re-
quired by || 73.30 through 73.35 for h-
.
.-n.L-.i shipments ha** been made. When a con-
IRKHM exempt irum the requirement* lur a
Commission license is the consignee of a fctaip-
mvni. i uc licensee
shall, before the shipment Is delivered
to the carrier, obtain written certifica-
tion from the contractor who is to take
delivery of the shinment at the f o.b.
point that the ph. -ileal protection ar-
rangement* required h\ rKI>A Manual or NKC
Manual (li j piers 2401 Ol 2405. as appiopi Hie,
ha«e been made.
i3> Each licensee who delivers special
nuclear material to a carrier for trans-
port shall alio make arrangements with
'he consignee to be notified Immediately
by Leie phone, telegraph, or teletype, ol
the arrival of the shipment at its
destination.
>d> In addition to complying with the
requirements specified in paragraptis (el
and <f> of this section, each licensee who
exports special nuclear material shall
comply with the requirements specified
in 5S 73 30 through 7335. as applicable.
up to the first point where the shipment
is taken off the vehicle outside the United
States. The licensee shall also nuikc ar-
rangements with the consignee to oe no-
tified immediately by telephone and
telegraph, teletype, or cable, of the ar-
rival of the shipment at its destination.
or of any such shipment that Is lost or
unaccounted for after the estimated time
of arrival at its destination.
(e> Each licensee who receives a sh!o-
mem of special nuclear material shall
Immediately notify the person who de-
livered the material to a carrier lor
transport of Lie arrival of the shipment
at its destination. In the event such a
shipment f:i;'s to arrive at its destination
at the estimated time, the consignee, if
a licensee, or in the case of an export
3 shipment, the licensee who exported the e
^ shipment, shall immediately notify by ^'
£ telephone and telegraph, or teletype, the %
x Diieut-rof th'- appropriate Nectar Regulatory a
* CommiMiun llMfwliull aitd Enfoicemcfll "
S Regional Office IL-red In Appendix A of $
this part, and the licensee ir other per-
son w-no delivered the material to a ear-
ner for transport The licensee who mado
the physical protection arrangement*
shall aiv> Immediately notify by tele-
phone and telesraph, or teletype She Di-
rector of the apprnpnjtc Nuclear Regulsltxy
Conimi\sion Inspection and tnlorcement Re-
gional ofT.ce liMcd in Appendix A nf the
action being taitcn to trace the shipment.
<f i Each Lcensee wno makes arrange-
meDU for physical procection of a Ship-
ment of special nuclear materlai as re-
quired by iJ 73.30 through 73.36 shall
immediately conduct a trace Investiga-
tion of any shipment that Is iost or un-
accounted for alter the estimated ar-
rival tim* and file a report with the
Commission as specified tn 1 73.71. If
the licensee
-.vho conducts the trace In-
vestigation is t.ut the consignee, he shall
alto immediately report the results of his
Investigation by telephene and telegraph.
or teletype to the consignee.
<g) Paragraphs (ai. tb>, <c> and




§ 73.40 p tir».rj| protection: General ro
quire-menu at lud aitc*.
Each licensee shall provide physical
protection against industrial sabotage
and against theft of special nuclear ma-
terial at the fixed sites where licensed
activities are conducted. Security plans
submitted to i lie Atomic Knergy (.orflltiistiMi
lor approval \itjM be followed by ihc licensee
ailci Match b, 1V74.
5 Y.*.SO Hrouiremenu for phr*ir»l pro-
tcrlion of \n <-m»«-.1 Brliviticth
In addition to any other requirements
of this part, each licensee who is author-
ized to operate a fuel reprocessing plant
pursuant to Part 50 of ihts chapter or
who possesses or uses uranlum-235 (con-
tained In uranium enriched to 20 percent
or more In the U-233 Isotope), urauiurn-
233. or Plutonium alone or In any com-
bination tn a quantity of 5000 grams or
more computed by the formula, grams =
(grams contained J-235) 4- 2.5 'grams
U-233 »- grams Plutonium), other than
In the operation of a nuclear reactor li-
censed pursuant to Part 50 of this chap-
ter, shall comply with the following.
(a) Physical security organization.
(I) The licensee shall esiabl^h a secu-
rity organization. Including guards, to
protect his facility against Industrial
sabotare and the special nuclear mate-
rial in lus possession against theft
<21 AC least one supervisor of the se-
curity uigumzation, shall be ou &lte at
all tunes.
(J) The hcenreesh.ill e>.taiJii>u, maln-
i.iiii and follow wntien security prcce-
ouies which document the structure of
the security organization ami wiiicn de-
tail tile duties of guards, wntchmen, and
oilier Individuals responsible for secu-
rity.
(4) The licensee shall not permit an
Individual to act as a t;uard or watch-
man unless such Individual has been
properly trained and equipped and has
qualified bv demonstrating: \\> An un-
derstancuiiB of the Licensee a security
procedures, and (it) the ability to exe-
cute all duties required of him by such
procedures. t.ach guard and watchman
shall be requalifled at tesst annually.
Sucll rcquaiif.cation shaj be docu-
mented.
*b» Physical earners. (1) The licensee
shall locate vital equipment only within
a vital area, which, in turn, shall be lo-
cated within a protected area such that
access to vital equipment requires pas-
sage through at least two physical bar-
riers. More than one vital area may bo
within a single protected area.
(2> The licensee shall locate material
access areas only within protected areas
such that access to ihe material access
area reou^rcs passage through at least
two physical barriers. More than one
material across *rea may be within a
single protected area.
J) The physical barrier at the pe-
rimeter of the protected area shall be
separated from any other barrier desig-
nated as a physical barrier within the
protected arei. and the intervening;
space monitored or periodically checked
to detect the presence of persons or ve-
hicles so that the facility security organi-
zation can respond to suspicious activity
or to the breaching of any physical bar-
rier.
'4> An Isolation zone shall be main*
talned around the physical barrier at the
perimeter of the pro'-ccted area and any
part of a building used as part of that
physical barrier. The Isolation tone shall
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be monitored to detect the presence of
individuals or vehicles within the zone so
as to allow response by armed members
of the licensee security organization to
be initiated at the time of penetration
of the protected area. Parking facilities,
both for emi) : n>cc . and visitors, shall be
located outsice the isolation zone.
5 Isolation zones and clear areas be-
tween barriers shall be provided with Il-
lumination sufficient for the monitoring
required by paragraph <b> (3) and (4)
of this section, but not less than 0.2 foot
candles.
<c) Access requirements. The licensee
shall control ail points of personnel and
vehicle access into a protected area, in-
cluding shipping or receiving areas, and
into each vital area. Identification of per-
sonnel and vehicles shall be made and
authorization shall be checked at such
points.
'1) At the point of personnel and ve-
hlcie access Into a protected area, all In-
dividuals, except employees who possess
an NKC or ERDA personnel security clearance,
and all hand-earned packages shall be
searched for devices such as firearms, ex-
plosives, and incendiary devices, or other
items which could be used for industrial
sabotage. The search shall be conducted
either by a physical search or by the use
o( equipment capable of detecting such
done*, tmployccs who pos&esi an NKC or
rKDA personnel securily clearance shall be
searched at random intervals. Subse-
qufnt to search, drivers of delivery and
service vehicles shall be escorted at all
times while within the protected area.
(2) All packages being delivered Into
the protected area shall be checked for
proper Identification and authorization.
Pncxages other than hand-carried
packages shall be searched at random
intervals.
'3> A picture badge identification sys-
tem shall be used for all Individuals who
are authorized access to protected areas
without escort.
(4) Access tc vital areas and material
access areas shell be limited 'x> Indi-
viduals who are authorized access to viuU
equipttieut or special nuclear material
and who require such access to perform
their duties. Authonzatlon for such indi-
viduals shall be provided by the issuance
of specially coc>d numbered badges indi-
cating vital areas and material access
areas to which access Is authorized. Un-
occupied vital areas and material access
areas shall be protected by an active in-
trusion alarm system.
(5) Individuals not employed by the
licensee shall be escorted by a watchman,
or other individual designated by '.he
licensee, while In a protected area and
shall be oadged to indicate that an escort
is require!. In addition, each Individual
not employed bv the licensee shall be re-
quired to register his name. date, time,
purpose of visit, employment affiliation,
citizenship, name and badge number of
the escort, and name of the Individual to
be visited. Except for a driver of a deliv-
ery or service vehicle, an individual not
employed by the licensee who requires
frequent and extended access to a pro-
tected Area or a vita) area need not be
escorted provided such Individual is pro-
vided: with a picture badge, which he
must receive upon entrance Into the pro-
tected area and which he must return
each time he leaves the protected area,
which Indicates (I) noncmployee-no
escort required. (11) rueas to which access
Is authorize-! and nil) the period for
which access has been authorized
(8) No vehicles used primarily for the
convev»nc* of individuals shall be per-
mitted within a protected area except
under emergency conditions.
<7> Keys, locks, combinations, and re-
lated equipment shall be controlled to
mlnmize the possibility of compromise
and promMly changed whenever there is
evidence that they have been compro-
mised. Upon termination of employment
of any emrlovee. keys, locks, combina-
tions, and related equipment to which
that employee had access shall be
changed.
fd) Detection aids. (I) All alarms re-
quired pursuant to this part shall an-
nunciate in a continuously manned cen-
tral alarm station located within the
protected area and in at least one other
continuously manned station, not neces-
sarily within the protected arra. such
that a smcle act cannot remove the ca-
pability cf calling for assistance or other-
wise resprndtng to an alarm. All alarms
shall oe sell* -checking and tamper indi-
cating. The amumeatlon of an alarm at
the onslte cer.trai alarm -U.uon shall
Indicate the type of alarm <eg.. Intru-
sion alarm, emergency exit alarm. etc>
and location. All intrusion alarms, emer-
gency exit alarms, alarm systems, and
line supervisory systems shail at mini-
fy rnum meet the performance and relia-
JJ bility levels indicated by GSA Interim
r> Federal Specification W-A-00450 B
X (CSA-F5S).
it '2) All emergency exits In each pro-
3 tected area and each vital area shall be
alarmed,
(e) Communication requirements. (P
Each guard or watchman on duty shall
be capable of maintaining continuous
communication with an individual In a
continuously manned central alarm sta-
tion within the protected area, who shall
be capable of calling for assistance frora
other guards and watchmen and from
local law enforcement authorities.
(2) The alarm stations required by
paragraph idnn of this section shall
have conventional telephone service for
communication with the law enforce-
ment authorities as described La para-
graph (e) (1) of thb section.
* (3) To provide the capability of con-
tinuous communication, two-way radio
voice communication shall be established
in addition to conventional telephone
service between local !:w enforcement
authorities and the facility and shall
terminate at the facility !n a continu-
ously manned central alarm station
within the protected area.
i4 ) All communications equipment,
including offsite equipment, shall remain
operaole from independent po^cer sources
in the event of Joss oi primary power.
(f ) Testing and maintenance. Each
Licensee shail test and maintain intrusion
alarms, emergency alarms, communica-
tions equipment, physical barriers, and
other security related devices or equip-
ment utilized pursuant to this section as
follows:
* 1
» All alarms, communications equip-
ment, physical barriers, and other secu-
rity related devices or equipment shall be
maintained In operable and effective
condition.
<2) Each Intrusion alarm shall be
functionally tested for operablllty and
required performance at the beginning
and end of each Interval during which
It is used for security, but not lest fre-
quently than once every seven (7) days.
(3> Communications equipment shall
be tested for operablUty and perform-
ance not less frequently than once at the
beginning of each security personnel
work shirt.
(g) Response requirement. (1) The
licensee shall establish liaison with
local law enforcement authorities. In de-
veloping his physical security plan, the
licensee shall take account of the prob-
able size and response time of the local
Law enforcement authority assistance.
(2) Upon detection, of abnormal pres-
ence or activity of persons or vehicles
within an isolation zone, a protected
area, a material access area or a vital
area, or upon evidence of Intrusion lnU>
a protected area, a material access area
or a vital area, the facility security or-
ganlzatlon shall i|> determine whether
or not a threat exists, ill) assess the ex-
tent of- the threat, If any. and (111) take
Immediate measures to neutralize the
threat, either by appropriate action by
facility guards or by calling for assist-
ance from local Law enforcement au-
thorities, or both.
(h> This section la effective March 0.
1974.
,
2 § 73.60 Additional requirements for the
$ physical protection of specul nuclear
r
material at fixed aitea.
" In addition to the applicable require-
3 menu of i 73-50. each licensee who pur-
suant to the regulations in Part 70 of
this chapter possesses at any site or con-
tiguous sites suoject to control by the
licensee uranium-233 (contained In
uranium enriched to 20 percent or more
in tne U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or
Plutonium alone or In any combination
In a quantity of 5.000 grama or more
computed by the formula, gramas (grama
contained U-235) +• 2.5 (grams U-233 +•
grams plutonlum) shall protect the spe-
cial nuclear material from theft or di-
version as follows:
(a> Access requirements. (1) Special
nuclear material snail be stored or proc-
essed only In a material access area. No
activities other than those which require
access to special nuclear material or
equipment employed In the process, use.
or storage of special nuclear material.
shail be permitted within a material ac-
cess area.
(2> Material access areas shall be lo-
cated only within a protected area to
which access is controlled.
(3) Special nuclear material not la
process shall be stored in a vault equip-
ped with an intrusion alarm or In a
vault- type room, and each such vault
or vault-type room shall be controlled
as a separate material access area.
<4> Enriched uranium scrap In the
form of small pieces, cutings, chips, so-
lutions or in other forms which result
from a manufacturing process, contained
In 30-gallon or larger containers, with a
uraruum-235 content of less than 0.25
grams per liter, may be stored within a.
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locked and separately fenced area which
Is within a larger protected area pro-
vided that the storage area is no closer
than 25 feet to the perimeter of the pro-
tected area. The storage arei when un-
occupied shall *ie protected by a cuard
or watchman who snail patrol at inter-
vals not exceeding 4 hours, or by intru-
sion alarms.
(5) Admittance to a material access
area shall be under the control of au-
thorized individual* and limited to Indi-
viduals who require such access to per-
form tncir duties.
i6) Prior to entry Into a material ac-
cess area, packages shall be searched for
devices such as firearms, explosives. In-
cendiary devices, or counterfeit substi-
tute Items wluch could be used for theft
or diversion of special nuclear material.
(7) Methods to observe Individuals
within material access areas to assure
that special nuclear material Is not di-
verted shall be provided and used on *
continuing basis.
tb) Exit requirement- Each Individual.
package, and vehicle shall be searched
for concealed special nuclear material
before exiting from a material access
area unless exit is into a contiguous ma-
terial access area. The search may be
carried out by a physical search or by use
of equipment capable of detecting the
presence of concealed special nuclear
material.
(c) Defection aid rc<jutrcment. Each
unoccupied material access area : hall be
o locked and protected by an Intrusion
£ alarm on active status. All emergency
l\ exits shall oe continuously alarmed.
X (di Testing and maintenance. Each
"- licensee shall test and maintain Intrusion
St alarms, physical barriers, and other de-
vices utilized pursuant to the require-
ments of this section as follows:-
( 1 > Intrusion alarms, physical bar-
riers, and other devices used for material
prelection shall be maintained in oper-
able condition.
(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be in-
spected and tested for operability and re*
quired functional performance at the be-
ginning and end of each Interval curing
which it i- used for material protection,
but not less frequently than once every
seven (7) days.
(e> This section Is effective March 6,
1374.
Rsco«os a* d RzrotT*
§ 73.70 Record*.
Each licensee subject to the provisions
of H 73.30 through 73 38 and/or 1 73 50
and/or % 73.60 shall keep the following
records:
<a> Names and addresses of all indi-
viduals who have been designated as au-
thorized Individuals.
ib» Names, addresses, and badge num-
bers of all Individuals authorized to have
access to vital equipment or special nu-
clear material, and the vital areas and
material access areas to which authori-
zation is granted.
<c> A register of visitors, vendors, and
other individuals not employed by the
license? recorded pursuant to I 73.S0ic>
(5).
<d> A log Indicating name, badge num-
ber, time of entry, reason for entry, and
time of exit of all Individuals granted
access to a normally unoccupied vital
area.
<e> Documents! 'on of on routine se-
curity tours and Inspection*, and of all
testa. Inspections, and maintenance per-
for^Cbd on physical barriers. Intrusion
alarms, communications equipment, and
other security related equipment used
pursuant to the requirements of this
part.
(fi A record at each onsttc alarm an-
nunciation location of each alarm, false
alarm, alarm check, and tamper Indica-
tion that idcntlles the type ot alarm, lo-
cation, alarm circuit, date, and time. Id
addition, details of response by facility
guards and watchmen to each alarm. In-
trusion, or other security Incident shall
be recorded.
<g) Shipments of special nuclear ma-
terial subject to the requirements of this
part. Including names of carriers, major
roads to be used, flight numbers In tho
case of air shipments, dates and expected
times of departure and arrival of ship-
ments, names and addresses of the moni-
tor and one alternate monitor at each
transfer point, verification of communi-
cation equipment on board the transfer
vehicle, names of Individuals who are to
communicate with the transport vehicle.
container seal descriptions and Identifi-
cation, and any other Information to
confirm the means utilized to comply
with H 73.30 through 73.-d Such Infor-
mation shall be recorded prior to ship-
ment. Information obtained during the
course of the shipment such as reports cf
all communications, change of shipping
plan Including monitor changes, trace ln-
i vesUgations and others shall also be
a recorded.
(h) Procedures for controlling access
to protected areas and for controlling'
access to keys for locks used to protect
special nuclear material,
g 73.71 Hepottavof unoceounied for »Uip-
menu, tuapeetrd theft, unlawful di-
version, or indufttriaJ «abo4Age.
<a> Each licensee who conducts a
trace Investigation of a lost or unac-
counted for shipment pursuant to
9 73.36(f) shall immediately report to the
Director of Die appropriate Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Inspection and Enforcement
Regional Orr.ce listed In Appendix A, by
telephone, telegram, or teletype, the de-
tails and results of his trace investigation
and shall file within a period of fifteen
( id ) days a written report to the Director
of the appropriate Inspection and Enforcement
Regional Office with a copy to the Director of
Inspection and Enfuiccment. U.S. Nuckar Reg-
ulatory Commission. Washington, D.C 20555.
setting forth the details and results of the trat*
investigation.
ibi Each licensee shall report Immedi-
ately to the Director of the appropriate
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and
Enforcement Regional Office listed in Ap-
pendix A, by telephone, telegram, or tele-
type, any incident ui wnich an attempt
Ins been made, or Is believed to have
been made, to commit a theft or unlaw-
ful diversion of special nuclear material
which he is licenced to possess, or to
commit an act of Industrial sabotage
aoainst his plant The Initial report shall
be followed within a period of fifteen
M5t d*ys bv a written report submitted
to i in- Director of the appropriate inspection and
^nforvement Regional Office, *itn a copy to the
Direcfui uf Inspection and Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear ReguUiory Commission. Washington,
o D.C. 20555. setting
t forth the details of the incident. Subse-
S quent to the submission of the written
a: ]ci>oTt required by this paragraph, a 11-
JJ;
ensee shall Immediately inform the Di-
rector of the appropriate Inspection and En-
forcement Regional Office by means of
a -Mitten report of any substantive ad-'
riitional intormatlon. which becomes




An injunction or other court order may
be obtained prohibiting any violation of
any provision of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. as amended, or Title II of the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, or
any regulation or order issued there-
under. A court order may be obtained
for the payment of a civil penalty Im-
posed pursuant to section 234 of the Act
Z for violation of section 53. 57. 62. 63, 81.
£ 32. 101. 103. 104. 107. or 109 of the Act,
tc or section 206 of the Energy Reorganiza-
** tion Act of 1974. or any rule, regulation,
? or order issued thereunder, or any term,
condition, or limitation of any license
issued thereunder, or for any violation
for which a license may be revoked under
section 186 of the Act. Any person who
willfully violates any provision of the
Act or any regulation or order Issued
thereunder may be guilty of a crime and,
upon conviction, may be punished by fine






TRAINING, EQUIPPING, AND QUALIFYING
OF GUARDS AND WATCHMEN
A. INTRODUCTION
Section 73.50 of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of
Plants and Materials," requires fuel reprocessing licensees
and persons licensed to possess certain specified quantities
of special nuclear material (SNM), respectively, to provide
trained and equipped guards and watchmen to physically protect
their facilities and to protect the SNM in their possession
against theft. Further, Sections 73.30 through 73.36 of 10
CFR Part 73 require certain shipments of SNM to be accompanied
by guards as escorts. This guide provides criteria acceptable
to the Regulatory staff for a program for training, equipping,
and qualifying guards and watchmen.
B. DISCUSSION
Guards and watchmen responsible for the protection of SNM
onside and in transit and for the protection of the facility
against industrial sabotage should, like other components of
the physical security system, meet minimum levels of perform-
ance and reliability. The licensee should assure that those
responsible for security are capable, and qualified to execute
the duties prescribed for them. Performance and reliability





2. Training and qualification, and
3. Testing and requalification.
Preemployment screening provides a means to determine
whether a prospective security employee is trustworthy and
capable of performing the security tasks that will be assigned
to him.
Training and qualification of guards and watchmen are
necessary to assure knowledge of the facility licensee's or
transport licensee's (transporter) security plan and to assure
a thorough understanding as to exactly what is and what is not
expected of each guard and watchman. Further, the legal
responsibilities and limitations involved in the execution of
his duties should be made clear to every guard and watchman.
Special emphasis should be given to the bearing and use of
firearms
.
Testing and requalification is needed to ensure the con-
tinued performance and reliability of guards and watchmen as
components of the security system.
The licensee should provide all guards and watchmen train-
ing with regard to the details of the security plan they are
expected to follow. The specific physical and training require-
ments of each guard and watchman will depend upon the duties
charged to that guard or watchman.
The Commission's regulations make the following distinction
between guards and watchmen: guards are armed and uniformed
and have protection of SNM against theft and/or the protection
of a plant against industrial sabotage as their primary duty;
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watchmen, who may or may not be armed and uniformed, protect
the plant and the SNM therein in the course of other duties.
For the purpose of this guide, the term watchman will refer
to an individual who is never armed, and a third category,
patrol watchman, will be considered as an arms qualified indi-
vidual who may be issued arms during an emergency or threat
situation and whose primary duty, at least during an emergency
or threat situation, is the protection of the plant and the
SNM therein.
For material shipments, armed escorts and armed monitors
are considered guards, and unarmed escorts are considered
patrol watchmen.
C. REGULATORY POSITION
A program acceptable to the Regulatory staff for the pre-
employment screening, training, testing, equipping, and quali-
fying of licensee security personnel should include the following
1 . Preemployment Screening
a. Minimum Qualification
Preemployment screening should be designed to assess
the suitability of an applicant for consideration as a member
of the licensee's security organization. The following are
minimum qualifications:
(1) Minimum age of 21.
(2) Minimum education high school diploma or
equivalent,
(3) No record of felony convictions.
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(4) General good health as determined by a
physician prior to employment.
b. Employment Application
An employment application should be used to pro-
vide a basis for the screening process. The application should
contain the following information:
(1) Full name,
(2) Date and place of birth,
(3) Citizenship,
(4) Current residence,
(5) Prior residences (past 5 to 10 years)
,
(6) Educational background (institutions, dates),
(7) Previous employment history (full adult life)
including supervisors, employment function, reason for termin-
ation.
(8) Military service,
(9) Record of criminal convictions.
c. Physical Capabilities
(1) All security personnel should be capable of
arduous physical exertion and be able to withstand exposure to
unusual or inclement weather,
(2) All security personnel should have vision
correctible to 20/20 (Snellen) in each eye,
(3) All security personnel should have hearing
loss not exceeding 30 dB in both ears, or 35 dB in the poorer
ear, relative to normal hearing,
(4) All security personnel should be mentally alert




If the licensee chooses to use a contract guard
service, he should accept only security personnel who have
undergone preemployment screening and who meet the qualifi-
cations prescribed above.
2. Training
Prior to assignment of security duties, each guard,
watchman, and patrol watchman, whether hired by the licensee
or provided by a contract service, should successfully com-
plete a training program consisting of the following:
a. General training as outlined in . . . ..-.-*
this guide,
b. Training specific to the facility or transport
licensee's security plan for normal, emergency, and threat
situations as outlined in ... ***.- this guide.
3 . Testing and Requalification
Each guard, watchman, and patrol watchman should be
tested and requalif ied according to the following schedule:
a. Facility or transport security plan: general
duties and responsibilities of security personnel --annually.
b. Facility or transport security plan: specific
duties and responsibilities as assigned--semiannually
,
c. Communication equipment and security equipment as
appropriate- - semiannually
,









The facility licensee, transporter, or contract service
should issue uniforms, firearms, communication devices, and
other security equipment as appropriate. Inspections should
be conducted and documented by the security supervisor of the
facility or transporter or by another individual designated
by the licensee at least quarterly to assure proper care and
condition of said equipment.
a. As a general practice, uniforms issued to guards
and uniformed watchmen and patrol watchmen should be markedly
distinct from those of local law enforcement authorities.
b. On-duty guards should be armed with sidearms of
not less than caliber .38. Weapons should be kept loaded at
all times while being carried by guards.
c. Weapons such as shotguns, rifles, riot guns, tear
gas, and mace should be available and issued to guards and
patrol watchmen as necessary. Such weapons should be loaded
only upon issue, and should remain loaded for as long as they
are carried by the guards or patrol watchmen.
d. Guards and watchmen on patrol should carry radio
communication devices. An intercom or other means should be
used to provide communication in areas of the facility where
direct radio communication is not possible.
e. Fixed-site security organizations should be pro-
vided with at least one dedicated vehicle, such as a jeep,
equipped with two-way radio communication for the purpose of
quick response to intrusion or to an alarm. If the patrol
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area is so large that only patrol by vehicle is practical,
at least one other dedicated vehicle should be provided. In
addition to radio communication, vehicles used for response
to intrusion or for armed escort of SNM shipments should be
equipped with a loaded shotgun or riot gun, extra rounds of
ammunition, flares, spare batteries for communication devices,
spotlights, a CO2 or dry powder fire extinguisher, and a first
aid kit.
D. GENERAL TRAINING PROGRAM
This section lists topics and suggested time allotments
for a 10-day general training program for guards and watchmen.
The program is divided into two sections: points of law and
security skills. The section of points of law is not intended
to be a course in all aspects of the law, but rather is intended
to introduce the guards and watchmen to, and familiarize them
with, some essential principles of law of which the guards and
watchmen should have a basic understanding in order to assist
and protect them in the proper performance of their duties.
Hence, the topics listed in that section should be covered in
sufficient depth to assure that each guard, watchman, and patrol
watchman possesses an understanding of (1) the general limits
of legal authority of a private security guard as provided by
State statutes and the common law, (2) the differences between
a felony and a misdemeanor insofar as that difference affects
his authority, (3) the permissible legal extent of a search
and seizure as affected by his suspicion of a crime and by
his actual witness of a crime, (4) the evidence generally
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necessary to prove the commission of a crime and particularly
the importance of the preservation of "real evidence," and
(5) the use of force legally permissible in self defense or
in prevention of a crime involving property. The section on
security skills should be directed at enabling security per-
sonnel to (1) perform their security duties in an effective
manner, (2) effectively cooperate with other security personnel
(including Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities)
responding to a request for assistance, and (3) effectively
defend themselves and others, if necessary.
The program need not be limited to the topics listed herein,
and other subjects may be included. Reasonable latitude is
expected to enable the licensee to develop his training program
to best suit his needs. When formulating and implementing his
training program, the licensee should consult with and obtain
the advice of State and local law enforcement authorities.
1. Scope
The general training program should be adequate to help
assure that the licensee's guards and watchmen are capable of
providing protection of the facility against sabotage or SNM
from theft, either in transit or at a fixed site, until the
arrival of assistance from law enforcement authorities. The
following potential sources of threats should be considered
in the training program:
a. Lone individuals familiar with the construction and
operation of the facility or the routing of vehicles
transporting SNM,
b. A group of several individuals, some of whom may be
armed with weapons such as rifles, sidearms, and explosives
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c. A group of unarmed individuals engaged in disorderly-
conduct or mob activities.
2 . Topics
The following is a list of topics which should be
presented, with suggested corresponding time allotments, in
the 10-day training program. This list is not intended to be
all inclusive nor is any recommendation made as to the order
of presentation.
Points of Law -- For this part of the training program
to be successful, the legal concepts in this section of the
program should be directly related to, and discussed in the
narrow context of, the duties that guards, watchmen, and patrol
watchmen are expected to perform. It is suggested that approx-
imately three days (24 hours) of the 10-day program be devoted
to discussion of the topics listed below:
Role of Law Enforcement 1 hour
A brief history of the development of law enforcement,
division of legal authority (e.g., Federal, State, and
local), and law enforcement ethics.
Legal Phrases and Definitions 2 hours
An explanation of the meanings and legal significance
of the most commonly used legal phrases that a guard or
watchman is likely to encounter.
Crimes and Elements 3 hours
Common law and/or statutory elements necessary for
establishing certain specific crimes (e.g., assault, assault
and battery, burglary, breaking and entering, larceny,
receiving stolen property, carrying a concealed weapon,
robbery)
.
Laws of Arrest (Criminal Laws) 4 hours
A discussion of the legal authority to make arrests
(without a warrant), probable cause, due process, rights
of the accused, and other constitutional guarantees. Dis-
cussion should emphasize amount of force permissible when




Rules of Evidence - 4 hours
Brief instruction in the fundamental concepts and
rules of evidence, generally what is admissible and what
is inadmissible in court as evidence, and methods of
preserving real evidence.
Search and Seizure 4 hours
An introduction to laws, rules, and methods of lawful
search and seizure specifically as they pertain to private
security guards and watchmen.
Techniques and Mechanics of Arrest 4 hours
Basic police techniques and methods used to make
proper arrests and safe searches.
Examination 2 hours
An examination should be given at the completion of
this section. A passing grade should be established as
one of the requirements for satisfactory fulfillment of
the course.
Security Skills -- Approximately seven days (56 hours)
of the 10-day training program should be devoted to the
following practiced security skills:
Self Defense 16 hours
(for guards and patrol watchman)
A discussion of defensive weapons and methods of
defending oneself against attack. Up to six hours
of physical training should be included.
First Aid 8 hours
Basic first aid techniques in emergency situations.
American Red Cross Standard Course should be taught.
Response to Crimes in Progress 3 hours
Descriptions of the proper action to be taken upon
observing or being notified of a crime in progress.
Patrol Procedures 4 hours
A discussion of functional patrol procedures and
methods in private property patrol, both on foot and
by vehicle.
Crowd and Mob Control 4 hours
Crowd control problems frequently faced by special
officers. State and Federal laws and court rulings
as well as police handling and control.
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Firearms Training -- 16 hours
(for guards and patrol watchman)
Firearms training for those who are armed while on
duty should be required in addition to the basic training
course. Training should include weapons familiarization,
weapons safety, and range firing of revolvers and shotguns
Firemanship 3 hours
A brief training period discussing the methods of
fire safety, fire prevention, and fire control.
Examination 2 hours
An examination should be given at the completion of
this section. A passing grade should be established
as one of the requirements for satisfactory fulfillment
of the course.
E. FACILITY OR CARRIER TRAINING PROGRAM
This section lists topics and suggested time allotments
for a 5-day (3-day for transporter guards) program of training
specific to the duties and responsibilities of guards, watch-
men, and patrol watchmen under the facility or carrier security
plan.
1 . Scope
Training with respect to the licensee's security plan
should be adequate to ensure that the licensee's guards and
watchmen are fully aware of the duties and responsibilities
charged to them under normal operating conditions, emergency
conditions, and threat situations. It should be emphasized
and clearly understood by every member of the security organ-
ization that under threat situations the primary responsibility
of the licensee's security organization is to provide protec-





The training program should emphasize that guards and
armed patrol watchmen are not to display or discharge their
weapons, but are to keep their weapons in their holsters and
are not to withdraw and discharge their weapons except in
situations when such conduct would be permitted under the law
of the State in which the facility is located or under the law
of the State through which the vehicle transporting special
nuclear material is traveling.
At no time should a guard or armed patrol watchman
fire a "warning shot" into the air or ground. Warnings should
be given verbally. Above all, it should be stressed to the
guards the vital importance to the public health and safety
and to the common defense and security of the United States
that the unauthorized removal of special nuclear material from
the facility or vehicle transporting the special nuclear
material or the industrial sabotage to the facility be pre-
vented.
2. Topics
Security Overview 3 hours
(2 hours for transporter escorts)
A discussion of the objectives of security plan,
details of security organization structure, and
command responsibility.
Records and Reports 3 hours
(2 hours for transporter escorts)
Detailed description of licensee procedures for
completing status, inspection, tour, and other appro-
priate routine and special reports.
Facility Alarm Systenw 8 hours
(Fixed site guards and watchmen)
Discussion of intrusion alarms used at the facility,
their operation, location, and testing procedures.
Explanation of the alarm testing schedules. Field
demonstrations of alarm equipment.
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SNM Transport Vehicles 1 hour
(Transporter escorts)
A description of the vehicles used to transport
SNM and of the methods of packaging SNM for shipment.
Communication Equipment 1 hour
Operation and routine testing of communications
devices used by the licensee.
Routine Procedures 8 hours
(Fixed site guards and watchmen)
A variety of topics should be covered; among them
are: identification checks: badges and badging
procedures; detection equipment used by licensee;
vital areas, what they contain, why they are vital;
escort procedures within protected area; personnel
and package searching procedures; patrol and
inspection procedures.
Emergency Procedures 4 hours
(Fixed site guards and watchmen)
Fire and criticality evacuation procedures, location
of fire equipment, and security procedures under
emergency conditions.
Emergency Procedures 3 hours
(Transporter escorts)
Security procedures following a vehicle accident.
Routine Procedures 3 hours
(Transporter escorts)
Discussion of check-in procedures, detour policy,
and shift-change procedures (long hauls)
.
Threat Situations 3 hours
Types of credible attack and expected response.
Procedures for calling for assistance: who to call,
when, what information is to be given.
Use of Firearms 2 hours
Proper use of firearms during threat situations
emphasizing permissible use of force in various
situations
.
Radiological Safety 5 hours
Areas where SNM is found at the facility, type and
form of the SNM stored, processed, or transported,
and identifying characteristics of SNM containers.
Provisions of the Commission's regulations for the
protection of personnel against exposure, health
problems associated with exposure, precautions and





No. No. Max imum
Shots Strings Target Points
5 2 25 yd (SF) 100
5 2 25 yd (TF) 100
5 2 Silhouette 100
Examination 3 hours
(2 hours for transporter escorts)
In addition to the above topics, training should
include up to six weeks of on-the-job supervision.
E. ARMS QUALIFICATION PROGRAM
Guards, and other individuals who may be issued arms
during a threat situation (e.g., patrol watchmen), should
qualify semiannually on one of the following courses:
Type
Range Fire Time
25 yd Slow 5 min
25 yd Timed 20 sec
25 yd Rapid 10 sec
Target Specifications:
25 yd (SF) - 21 in. x 24 in. with No. 7, 8, 9, and 10
rings black and black area 5.50 in. diameter (B-16).
25 yd (TF) - 21 in. x 24 in. with No. 9 and 10 rings
black and black area 5.54 in. diameter (B-8).
Silhouette - B-27
Guards must achieve a minimum point total of 175.
1. National Police Course - Firing Stages:
a. Seven-Yard Course: Twelve shots double action
from the crouch position. Time starts with gun
in holster and includes reloading for second
six shots. Time allowed: 25 seconds.
b. Twenty-Five-Yard Course: Six shots kneeling,
double action; six shots standing, double action,
left hand from behind barricade; six shots stand-
ing, double action, right hand from behind barricade
Time allowed: 90 seconds.
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c. Fifty-Yard-Course: Six shots sitting, six shots
prone, six shots left hand police standing from
behind barricade, and six shots right hand from
barricade single action. Time allowed: 2 minutes
and 45 seconds.
d. Twenty-Five-Yard Course: Six shots standing
without support, single action. No barricade
or other support is used. Time allowed: 12
seconds
.
Target Specifications: B-27 Target
Guards must achieve a minimum percentage score of 70%.
In addition, guards and patrol watchmen should be instructed
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